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ABSTRACT 
At the same time that the Department of Defense (DoD) has leveraged Network 
Centric Warfare concepts to increase the operational effectiveness of U.S. military forces 
and to gain decision superiority over adversaries, the DoD has become increasingly 
dependent upon the secure operations of computer networks and infrastructure.  As a 
result, DoD computer network operations have become a vital center of gravity of U.S. 
military forces.  Unfortunately, computer networks are growing faster than the DoD can 
defend them, while cyber attack sophistication and numbers of attacks continue to rise.  
In addition, many nation-states have begun to invest in developing real cyber warfare 
capabilities.  Therefore, it is critical to U.S. military operations that the DoD has the 
capability to defend its own networks against aggressive adversaries. 
Alarmingly, the DoD currently does not have a formal foundation for Computer 
Network Defense doctrine.  All existing doctrine and regulations focus on computer and 
network security and not warfare.  Another challenge in the development of effective 
doctrine with respect to cyber warfare is that we have little real historical experience of 
conducting it.  However by leveraging the similarities of the air warfighting domain to 
that of the warfighting domain of cyberspace, this thesis will extrapolate historical 
doctrinal lessons regarding defensive air power doctrine to build a foundation for the 
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A. PURPOSE AND RELEVANCE 
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to expand its Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) capabilities leveraging U.S. advantage in computer network and 
information technologies in order to gain asymmetric battlefield advantage to get inside 
adversary decision cycles to shorten the “kill chain.”  As a force multiplier, NCW 
continues to increase the operational effectiveness of U.S. military forces; however as a 
consequence, U.S. military operations have become increasingly dependent upon the 
secure operations of DoD computer networks.  Thus, DoD computer network operations 
have become a vital center of gravity of U.S. military forces.1  Lieutenant General Robert 
Elder, the Commander of the 8th Air Force (the predecessor to Air Force (AF) Cyber 
Command), reinforced this assessment as follows: 
The Air Force now recognizes that cyberspace ops is a potential center of 
gravity for the United States and, much like air and space superiority, 
cyberspace superiority is a prerequisite for effective operations in all 
warfighting domains.2 
At the same time, the proliferation of “cyber weapons” and cyber crime tools 
continues to increase, making them easier and cheaper to obtain, easier to use, more 
effective at defeating network defenses, and more dangerous.3  Combined with the 




                                                 
1 Information Operations Roadmap (DECLASSIFIED), Oct 30, 2003, 
http://freegovinfo.info//node/913, Last accessed Sept 11, 2007, 6 and Clay Wilson, Network Centric 
Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, Updated Mar 15, 2007, Washington, DC:  
Congressional Research Service, 2007, 12-14. 
2 Lt Gen Robert Elder as quoted in Peter A. Bauxbaum, “Air Force Explores the Next Frontier,” GCN 
Magazine, Feb 19, 2007 reprinted in U.S. Air Force Aim Points, Feb 21, 2007, 
http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=16792, Last accessed Feb 21, 2007. 
3 Clay Wilson, Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar:  Capabilities and Related 
Policy Issues, Updated Jun 5, 2007, Washington, DC:  Congressional Research Service, 2007, 11-12 and 
Graeme Wearden, “Price of Cybercrime Tools Shrinks,” ZDNet, Feb 9, 2007, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-
1009_22-6158025.html, Last accessed Feb 16, 2007. 
 2 
civilian computer networks has been increasing at an alarming rate, adversary cyber 
operations pose an increasing threat to DoD networks, U.S. military operations, U.S. 
national security, and U.S. sovereignty.4   
U.S. adversaries recognize that the DoD is dependent upon information 
superiority and critical information infrastructure; thus, many nations and organizations 
have demonstrated and continue to invest in their cyber attack capabilities.5  In the 
assessment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2003: 
Networks are growing faster than we can defend them…unprotected 
networks surrender asymmetric advantage…attack sophistication is 
increasing…[and the] number of [network] events is increasing.6 
Therefore, the DoD and each U.S. military service faces the daunting challenge of 
determining how they should employ the most effective “capabilities to shape and defend 
cyberspace” against determined adversaries and mounting threats.7 
 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To confront these cyber threats, the Joint Staff established Computer Network 
Operations (CNO) as one of five core capabilities within joint Information Operations 
(IO) doctrine.8  Similarly at the service level, the AF published Network Warfare 
Operations (NW Ops) doctrine as one of four mission areas within AF Information 
Operations doctrine.9  These doctrines state that joint and AF forces will perform the 
                                                 
4Rita Teehan, Data Security Breeches:  Context and Incident Summaries, Updated May 7, 2007, 
Washington, DC:  Congressional Research Service, 2007, 1-6. 
5 Charles Billo and Welton Chang, Cyberwarfare:  An Analysis of Means and Motivations of Selected 
Nation States, Hanover, NH:  Dartmouth College Press, 2004 and Planning Considerations for Defensive 
Information Warfare - Information Assurance.  Falls Church, VA:  Defense Information Systems Agency, 
1993, 16-17. 
6 Information Operations Roadmap (DECLASSIFIED), 44-45. 
7 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Feb 6, 2006, Washington, DC:  Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2006, 32, http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/, last accessed Feb 8, 2007. 
8 Joint Publication (JP) 3-13:  Information Operations, Feb 13, 2006, Washington, DC:  Office of the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf, last accessed 
Feb 6, 2007. 
9 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5:  Information Operations, Jan 11, 2005, Washington, DC:  
Air Force Publishing, 2005, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/dd/afdd2-5/afdd2-5.pdf, last 
accessed Feb 6, 2007.  In addition, “Computer Network Operations” (abbreviated CNO) in joint doctrine is 
synonymous with “Network Warfare Operations” (abbreviated NW Ops) in AF doctrine.  For brevity, the 
joint term CNO will be used from this point forward in reference to both CNO and NW Ops. 
 3 
mission of Computer Network Defense (CND)/Network Defense (NetD);10 however, 
neither publication provides doctrinal guidance as to how military forces at the 
operational/campaign level should be employed to effectively defend DoD or AF 
networks to fend off cyber attacks while they are in progress.  A survey of all joint 
publications (JPs) reveals that subordinate JPs exist for four of the five IO core 
capabilities;11 however, a JP on CNO (and thus CND) is absent.  A comparable survey of 
AF Doctrine Documents (AFDD) reveals the same gap--that is, an AF doctrinal 
publication on NW Ops (and thus NetD) is also missing.  Furthermore, an exhaustive 
survey of DoD Directives (DODD), DoD Instructions (DODI), Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instructions (CJCSI), CJCS Manuals (CJCSM), Air Force 
Instructions (AFI), Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP), Operational Navy 
Instructions (OPNAV INST), and Field Manuals (FM) reveals that an overwhelming 
preponderance of guidance focused on operational risk management methodologies to 
mitigate risks before cyber attacks occur by reducing vulnerabilities in information 
systems through information security (INFOSEC) programs, information assurance (IA) 
programs, certification/accreditation programs, and defense-in-depth architectures (see 
Appendix A for a list of the most current and relevant DoD publications on this topic).  
The sum of these measures equates to building, designing, and maintaining information 
systems and infrastructure that are less vulnerable to and more fortified against cyber 
attacks; however, these pre-attack measures do not provide guidance on how to wage an 
effective CND campaign against a determined adversary during attacks.  The only two 
reference to CND responses to cyber attacks in progress are 1) one-half of a page of text 
acknowledging that DoD components shall develop and execute courses of action in 
response to network attacks12 and 2) clarification that Joint Task Force-Global Network 
Operations (JTF-GNO) and/or subordinate commanders will develop Tailored Response 
                                                 
10 “Computer Network Defense” (abbreviated CND) in joint doctrine is synonymous with “Network 
Defense” (abbreviated NetD) in AF doctrine.  For brevity, the term CND will be used from this point 
forward in reference to both CND and NetD. 
11 The five core IO capabilities Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations (CNO), 
Operational Security (OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
12 DODI 8530.2:  Support to Computer Network Defense (CND), Mar 9, 2001, Washington, DC:  
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2002, 22 and 32, http://iase.disa.mil/policy.html, last accessed Feb 20, 
2007. 
 4 
Options (TROs) to respond to specific intrusion characteristics.13  However, these 
references provide no doctrinal clarity or details regarding how those courses of action 
should be developed or executed. 
An expanded survey of scholarly works and other government documents reveals 
that these works fall into two broad categories.  The first category includes publications 
that focus on cyber warfare at the strategy and policy level (see Appendix B for a list of 
the most current and relevant publications on this topic).  These publications address 
policy recommendations, decisions, and evolutions at the national/grand strategic level 
aimed at strategically posturing the United States to leverage and protect cyberspace in 
order to protect U.S. national interests.  In the area of CND, these publications discuss 
policies aimed at reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and information 
systems before cyber attacks occur and/or enhancing recovery capabilities after cyber 
attacks have occurred; however, these documents do not address the best 
operational/campaign-level framework for defending against and repelling cyber attacks 
while they are occurring.  The second category of publications focuses on cyberwarfare 
tactics, techniques, and/or tools (see Appendix B).  These publications discuss specific 
methods or tools (such as encryption, anti-virus, biometrics, access controls, filters, and 
intrusion detection, backup and recovery, etc.) that can be employed to reduce the 
vulnerability of information systems before cyber attacks occur and/or to enhance 
recovery capabilities after cyber attacks have occurred.  However, these documents also 
fail to address the best operational/campaign-level framework needed to defend friendly 
networks against cyber attacks in progress.  Only one scholarly document provides a 
methodology for CNO; however, it only covers computer network attack (CNA) and 
computer network exploitation (CNE) mission areas and explicitly leaves out the mission 
area of CND, stating that “the significant task of how to defend against an attack will not 
be addressed in this paper.”14  In summary, this body of knowledge fails to answer one 
                                                 
13 Strategic Command Directive 527-1 (SD 527-1):  Department of Defense Information Operations 
Condition (INFOCON) System Procedures, Jan 27, 2006, Offutt Air Force Base, NE:  Headquarters U.S. 
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), 2006, 
https://infosec.navy.mil/pub/docs/documents/dod/dodd/stratcom_d527-011_infocon_20060127.pdf, last 
accessed Feb 16, 2007. 
14 Juan Carlos Vega, Computer Network Operations Methodology, Monterey, CA:  Navy Postgraduate 
School, 2004. 
 5 
very basic question:  At the operational level of war, how should U.S. military forces be 
employed to fight an effective CND campaign against determined, active, and adaptive 
adversaries when they attack friendly computer networks?  To bring this question into 
tighter focus for the AF, how should AF network defense forces be employed to fight an 
effective CND campaign across all AF networks against determined, active, and adaptive 
adversaries at the operational level of war? 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
One of the difficulties in the development of effective doctrine with respect to 
cyber warfare is that we have little experience conducting it.  Our understanding of its 
conduct is necessarily based to a large extent on theoretical speculation and hypothetical 
scenario-building.  As General Ronald E. Keys, Commander of the AF’s Air Combat 
Command, so eloquently stated when describing the AF’s new Cyber Command and 
calling cyberspace the AF’s new high frontier, “this is about warfare, not about 
novelty.”15  Therefore, drawing upon the similarities between the warfighting domain of 
cyberspace to that of the air domain (e.g. speed of operations, distance of effects, vastness 
of areas of operations (AOs), permeability of borders/boundaries, degrees of 
freedom/maneuver, difficulty in building massive fortifications, etc.), this thesis will 
answer the research question above through a comparative case study comparing and 
contrasting the conduct of a CND campaign today with that of two historical air defense 
campaigns.  In both forms of warfighting, it is apparent that operational level command-
and-control (C2) relationships, operational employment, and technology employment are 
important factors to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of defensive doctrine and 
campaigns at the operational level of war.  The major argument of this thesis is that the 
proper combination of operational level C2, operational employment, and technology 
employment are sufficient to explain the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of air defense 
campaigns and thus computer network defense campaigns. 
 
                                                 
15 Gen Ronald E. Keys as quoted in Erik Holmes, “Wynne Is Pleased with Tanker ‘Horse Race’”Air 
Force Times, Feb 26, 2007, 10. 
 6 
The major questions that this thesis will answer are 1) how analogous are the 
domains of cyberspace and airspace and how are they different, 2) how does operational 
level C2 impact the effectiveness of defensive campaigns, 3) how does operational 
employment impact the effectiveness of defensive campaigns, and 4) how does 
technology employment impact the effectiveness of defensive campaigns? 
Chapter II will focus on comparing and contrasting the domains of airspace and 
cyberspace in order to establish more clearly the extent to which the warfighting 
properties of cyberspace are conceptually similar to those of airspace.  Then, historical 
case studies regarding operational level defensive air campaigns will be analyzed in 
Chapters III and IV.  The two cases that have been selected are the British defensive air 
campaign during the Battle of Britain in 1940 and the Egyptian defensive air campaign 
during the Six Days War in 1967.  The Battle of Britain was selected because it 
represents the first modern air campaign; furthermore, British air power doctrine was 
battle-tested during this campaign with positive results (e.g. the successful defense of the 
United Kingdom against the invasion of German military forces).16  On the other end of 
the spectrum, the Six Days War represents an air campaign in the jet and missile age; 
furthermore, Arab air power doctrine was battle-tested during this campaign with 
negative results (e.g. the failed defense of the Egypt against Israeli invasion).17  Both  
 
                                                 
16 Len Deighton, Battle of Britain, London, UK:  George Rainbow Limited, 1980; “The Battle of 
Britain Toolkit,” (Air Command and Staff College Project 97-0564.01 updated Apr 28, 2001), Air 
Command and Staff College Distance Learning CD version 3.2, Maxwell AFB, AL:  Air University Press, 
2003; Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain:  The Myth and the Reality, New York, NY: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2000; T.P. Gleave, "The Battle of Britain: Strategy, Tactics, Atmosphere," Flight International, 
September 16, 1965, 494-502; John Monsarrat, "Radar in Retrospect, How It Helped Win the Battle of 
Britain and the Battle of Okinawa," Journal of Electronic Defense, 14-10, October 1991, 92-100; Sir Hugh 
Trenchard, "Air Power and National Security," Royal Air Force Pamphlet, August 1946; Sir Hugh 
Trenchard, "The Principles of Air Power in War,"  Air Power, Three Papers by the Viscount Trenchard, 
Paper Two: 18-28, May 1945; The Battle of Britain History Site, 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html, last accessed Feb 6, 2007; and The Battle of Britain 
Historical Society, http://www.battleofbritain.net/, last accessed Feb 6, 2007. 
17 Michael Oren, Six Days of War:  June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, Oxford, 
UK:  Oxford University Press, 2002; Kenneth M. Pollack, “Air Power in the Six-Day War,” The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 28, No. 3, June 2005, 471-503; Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War:  Military 
Effectiveness, 1948-1991, Lincoln, NE:  University of Nebraska Press, 2002; Stanley S. Gunnersen, A 
Study of Airpower Employment in the Six Days War, Maxwell AFB, AL:  Air University, 1971; John F. 
Kreis, Air Warfare and Air Base Air Defense, 1914-1973.  Washington, DC:  Office of Air Force History, 
U.S. Air Force, 1988, 306-319; Lon O. Nordeen, Jr.  Air Warfare in the Missile Age, Washington, DC:  
Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002, 111-123; Leo Heiman, “Soviet Air Tactics—No Room for Initiative,” 
Air Force Magazine, 51, Aug 1968, 42-45. 
 7 
cases shall be analyzed in order to glean key insights as to how operational command and 
control, operational employment, and technology employment contributed to or detracted 
from the effectiveness of each respective air defense campaign. 
For clarity, cyber warfare discussions in Chapter II and air warfare discussions in 
Chapters III and IV will be purposefully kept separate within these respective chapters in 
order to avert confusion of the facts and propositions (e.g. cyber warfare will not be 
discussed in Chapters III and IV).  Then, Chapter V will fuse the observations from 
Chapters II, III, and IV in order to build the base proposals for Computer Network 
Defense doctrine.  The successful lessons from the Battle of Britain and the failed lessons 
from the Six Days War will be combined in the context of the doctrinally significant 
attributes of the warfighting domain of cyberspace.  Analogy shall be used to develop a 
thought experiment for what the first real cyber war might look like in order to clarify 
how these CND doctrinal propositions would apply. 
The thesis will close with a recommendation to the AF to build a system 
correlating to successful historical employments of integrated air defenses of the past to 
answer the question “how should AF network defense forces be employed to fight an 
effective CND campaign across all AF networks against determined, active, and adaptive 
adversaries?”  The findings of this research will be used to make specific 
recommendations regarding the desirable characteristics of integrated cyber defenses, 
conceived by analogy with successful integrated air defenses of the past.  The emphasis, 
as has been proposed, will be on operational level C2, operational employment, and 
technology employment to effectively fuse network defensive capabilities across 
platforms.  The findings of this research will help set the stage for a draft CND doctrinal 
framework and may inspire further doctrinal research to begin filling the CND doctrinal 
gap across the DoD.  Finally, this proposed CND methodology can be combined with 
Juan Vegas aforementioned proposed CNO framework18 (that covers the CNA and CNE 
mission areas) to provide starting point for doctrinal discussions on CNO, CNA, CNE, 
and CND with the objective of publishing a new joint doctrinal publication. 
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II. AS A WARFIGHTING DOMAIN, WHAT IS CYBERSPACE? 
A. CYBERSPACE — THE NEW “HIGH FRONTIER?” 
Lieutenant General Robert Elder, the Commander of the 8th Air Force (the 
predecessor to AF Cyber Command), captured the core challenge facing the AF and the 
DoD regarding warfare in cyberspace when he stated: 
For [the AF], one of the big things was understanding what the cyberspace 
domain is and then what operations in cyberspace means .... how 
cyberspace could be used to enhance our contributions to a joint fight.19 
Before military policymakers can decide how to best organize, train, and equip a viable 
military force that can conduct decisive operations in cyberspace, they must have a 
fundamental and common understanding of what cyberspace is as a warfighting domain.  
Military strategists take for granted their common understanding of the classical 
warfighting domains of air, land, sea, and space as well as what their key attributes are in 
reference to warfighting; furthermore, military doctrine for each of these domains is 
uniquely adapted and updated to best leverage these attributes to gain military advantage 
on the battlefield.  The warfighting domain of cyberspace, in contrast, lacks this basic 
definition, understanding, or identification of key attributes.  Without this foundation, the 
prefix "cyber" has been haphazardly and inappropriately attached to many military terms 
with detrimental effects to effective doctrinal debates about warfare in cyberspace. 
This chapter will rectify this problem by answering the question "as a warfighting 
domain, what is cyberspace?"  Second, it will expound upon this basic definition by 
clarifying key related military terms as they pertain to warfighting in cyberspace.  
Finally, this chapter will initially assess the doctrinal implications for warfighting in 
cyberspace based upon this working definition. 
 
                                                 
19 Lt Gen Robert Elder as quoted in SSgt C. Todd Lopez, “Fighting in Cyberspace Means Cyber 
Domain Dominance,” AF Print News, Feb 28, 2007, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123042670, last 
accessed Sept 11, 2007. 
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B. ASSUMPTIONS 
To scope the problem of defining cyberspace as a warfighting domain, analysis 
will be purposefully limited to the perspective of military warfighters currently tasked 
with primary responsibility for combat operations in cyberspace, to include the 
Combatant Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the Commander of 
Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), the Joint Functional 
Component Commander for Network Warfare (JFCC-NW), and related service 
component commands.  In addition, analysis will be focused at the operational level of 
war in the context of conventional warfare (state versus state; military versus military).  
This level of analysis affords more fruitful discussions regarding operational art, doctrine, 
and military capabilities, whereas the tactical level would drive the discussion towards 
tactics, techniques, procedures and technical details.  Likewise, the strategic level would 
lend itself to policy discussions vice doctrinal analysis.  Within this warfighting 
analytical framework, actors in cyberspace will be categorized as combatants or non-
combatants, and as such, the Laws of Armed Conflict apply.  In keeping with current 
legal interpretations of the Laws of Armed Conflict, combatants and non-combatants 
must be people, and thus botnets, zombienets, etc. cannot be combatants any more than a 
jet or a tank can.  In summary, the following analysis will evaluate an operational level 
commander’s perspective of what cyberspace is as a warfighting domain and how he/she 
would likely employ military forces to conduct campaigns and operations in cyberspace. 
 
C. CYBERSPACE — A BASIC DEFINITION 
In 1984, the term cyberspace first appeared in the science fiction work 
Neuromancer where the author described cyberspace as: 
A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate 
operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts 
... A graphic representation of data abstracted from banks of every 
computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light 
ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data.20 
 
 
                                                 
20 William Gibson, Neuromancer, New York, NY:  Ace Books, 1984, 69. 
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Since then and in concert with the boom of the Internet and World Wide Web (WWW) in 
the 1990s, the term cyberspace has most often been used as a metaphor for a virtual 
world created by computers21 and is typically used synonymously in reference to the 
Internet or the WWW.  This misinterpretation has even been captured in DoD doctrine 
which defines cyberspace as "the notional environment in which digitized information is 
communicated over computer networks."22 
A virtual, notional, or metaphorical definition of cyberspace presents two key 
problems.  First, it is difficult to build real military capability or conduct real military 
operations in a domain that doesn't really exist.  Second, this definition cannot explain the 
measurable, real-world impacts of events in cyberspace such as computer systems 
breached, identities stolen, lives affected, time/work/data destroyed or compromised and 
associated monetary impacts, cascading electrical grid outages, airline flights delayed, 
“cyber wars,”23 etc.  Also, cyberspace is comprised of physical, engineered components 
and produces both positive and negative effects in the physical world.  Information 
content and information flow are also real.  Signals, bits, and bytes are all real, 
measurable phenomena.  Therefore, cyberspace is not a metaphor, virtual world, notional 
environment, or hallucination.  Cyberspace is real and must be defined in real terms. 
Throwing out myriad metaphorical definitions of cyberspace, the most useful and 
complete definition of cyberspace as a warfighting domain that is currently available is: 
A domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic 
spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and 
associated infrastructures.24 
                                                 
21 Libicki, Martin C.  Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors.  Washington, DC:  National 
Defense University, 1997. 
22 Joint Publication (JP) 1-02:  Department of Defense (DoD) Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, Apr 12, 2001 (as amended through Jan 12, 2007), Washington, DC:  Office of the Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, last accessed Sept 11, 
2007. 
23 Such as the Palestinian-Israeli, China-United States, and Russia-Estonia Cyberwars, for example. 
24 AF Operational Concept – Cyberwarfare (DRAFT), Apr 1, 2007, San Antonio, TX:  67th Network 
Warfare Wing,  3. 
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Put another way, the cyberspace domain is "the maneuver space of the electromagnetic 
spectrum."25  This definition is based upon real/physical elements of electronics and the 
electromagnetic (EM) spectrum.  Examples of the real components that comprise 
cyberspace are visualized in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Activities and Systems in the Cyber Domain (From 26) 
 
This definition effectively captures the core components of cyberspace to include 
electronics, infrastructure, data flow, and content as encoded and processed in 
cyberspace.  It also provides a good starting point to further explore the robustness of this 
definition and to establish the basic attributes of cyberspace in order to set a proper 
foundation upon which to conduct further doctrinal analysis. 
 
                                                 
25 Dr. Lani Kass, Director of the USAF Cyberspace Task Force, in Henry S. Kenyon, “Task Force 
Explores New Military Frontier,” Signal Magazine, 61, No. 2, Oct 2006,  56. 
26 Figure 2.1, AF Operational Concept - Cyberwarfare (DRAFT),  3. 
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D. DOCTRINALLY SIGNIFICANT ATTRIBUTES OF CYBERSPACE 
An analytical framework is needed to properly dissect and establish the basic 
attributes of cyberspace in terms consistent with our current understanding of the 
classical warfighting domains of air, land, sea, and space.  Milan Vego, a professor at the 
Naval War College, provides a simple yet useful framework for analyzing operational 
level warfare in terms of the critical factors of space, forces, and time.27  Combined with 
the Naval War College chart in Table 3 of Appendix C, which compares some key 
features of the warfighting domains of air, land, and sea, this framework can be expanded 
to compare and contrast the key attributes of all warfighting domains.  The dominant 
attributes which impact military operations in space are terrain, dimensions and degrees 
of freedom/maneuver, physical laws, and obstructions.  The two most common military 
instruments used by forces to conduct military operations in said space are weapons to 
attack the adversary and fortifications to protect against adversary aggression.  Adding 
the factor of time, military forces in space conduct operational movements and 
operational maneuvers over time with the objective of defeating the adversary on the 
battlefield.  In conducting operational movements and maneuvers, the range and speed of 
both opposing forces and their weapons in each domain become significant factors.  In 
summary, the doctrinally significant factors of any warfighting domain are terrain, 
dimensions and degrees of freedom/maneuver, physical laws, weapons, fortifications, 
operational movements, operational maneuvers, range, and speed.  Using the table in 
Appendix C as a model, core attributes for the air, land, sea, and space warfighting 
domains can be derived to create Table 1.  Furthermore, this table identifies the key 
questions that must be answered in order to build a fundamental doctrinal understanding 
of cyberspace as a warfighting domain (see empty far right column). 
 
                                                 
27 Milan Vego, Operational Warfare, Newport, RI:  Naval War College, 2000,  29-103. 
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Warfighting Domain Attributes
Domain Land Sea Air Space Cyberspace
Made of Earth Water Air Vacuum ?
Lead Service Army Navy Air Force Air Force ?
Operational Doctrine and 
Developments
METT-T … Future 
Combat System & Future 
Force Warrior
Power Projection & Sea 
Control …
Sea Shield, Sea Strike & 
Sea Basing
Global Reach/Power, Air 
Superiority (Tenants of Air 
Power) … Interdependent 
Fight
Operational Responsive 





Gravity and Friction Gravity, Buoyancy, and 
Fluid Dynamics
Gravity and Aerodynamics Gravity and Orbital 
Mechanics
?
Physical Dimensions & 
Degrees of Freedom
2 (fwd-back, left-right) 2 or 3 (fwd-back, left-right, 
up-down [subsurface])
3 (fwd-back, left-right, up-
down)




Natural Obstructions to 
Movement
Elevation, Bodies of 
Water, and Rough Terrain
Bodies of Land and 
Shallow Water
Air Density and Elevated 
Terrain (Mountains/Hills)
Atmosphere ?
Combat Range/Radius Tens to Hundreds of miles Thousands of miles Hundreds to Thousands of 
miles
Tens of thousands of 
miles+
?
Movement Speed 0-50 mph 0-50 knots 0-Mach 2+ 0-35K mph+ ?
Forces, Weapons, and 
Fortifications (Typical 
examples)
Infantry (Guns, Grenades, 
Mortars, RPGs),  Artillery 
(Cannons, Rockets, 







Hovercraft, Patrol Craft 
(Machine Guns, Cannons, 
Missiles, Rockets, Depth 
Charges), Armor
Fighters, Bombers, 
Helicopters (Machine Guns, 
Cannons, Missiles, Rockets, 







Table 1.   Warfighting Domain Analytical Framework 
 
1. Terrain in Cyberspace 
In military context, terrain is defined as "a piece of ground having specific 
characteristics or military potential."28  Furthermore, terrain analysis is defined as "the 
collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of geographic information on the 
natural and man-made features of the terrain, combined with other relevant factors, to 
predict the effect of the terrain on military operations."29  Based upon these definitions, 
terrain should impact operations in cyberspace just as it impacts operations in the other 
four classical warfighting domains.  Terrain provides the space in which forces operate, 
impacts the operations of said forces, delineates friendly/enemy/neutral territory, and 
encompasses combatants and non-combatants.  A basic understanding of the terrain of 
cyberspace is necessary to any credible doctrinal discussion on this domain. 
                                                 
28 Dictionary.com, WordNet® 3.0.  Princeton University, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/terrain, last accessed Sept 10, 2007. 
29 JP 1-02,  541. 
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Per the basic definition of cyberspace, cyberspace is made of electronics and the 
EM spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated 
infrastructures.30  Furthermore, electronics and EM spectrum can be further subdivided 
into two broad categories:  analog and digital. 
For EM signals, the rules governing movement and maneuver are dictated by the 
laws of physics relating to the signal propagation of EM energy waves, whether it is radio 
waves, electrical pulses, laser light, etc. and regardless of transmission medium.31  These 
laws are constant throughout the universe and apply to all EM signals within and 
traversing between electronics through any medium.  As such, the degrees of freedom 
and maneuver for EM signals is 3-dimensional, the range is limited by the power of 
signal, and natural obstructions come in the form of physical obstructions to signals (line 
of sight obstructions, Faraday cages, breaks in communications lines, interference, etc.).  
These variables are captured in the various forms and derivations of the radar range 
equation.  All EM signals travel at speeds close to that of the speed of light.32  The 
combat radius or range of these signals is directly associated with the location of the 
transmitter source and receivers, the strength or power of the signal being transmitted, the 
loss of the signal as it traverses the medium (air, copper, space, fiber, etc.), and the 
capability of the receiver to discern the signal from noise.  This range can be extended by 
networking EM switching devices to create long distance connectivity (e.g. telephone 
networks, the Internet, etc.).  As such, natural obstructions come in the form of breaks in 
the connectivity established by networks.  Today, this type of connectivity spans much of 
the globe (like in the WWW) and extends the combat radius or range for cyber operations 
to the global scale.  Based on current human understanding of physical laws, the physics 
governing EM signals are non-changing and non-negotiable. 
In order to extend human senses and communications beyond the limits of our 
physical bodies, engineers have leveraged EM physics to create rules that enable 
electronics to store, process, and exchange information.  These rules give EM waveforms 
                                                 
30 AF Operational Concept - Cyberwarfare (DRAFT),  3. 
31 Richard A. Poisel, Introduction to Communication Electronic Warfare Systems, Boston, MA:  
Artech House, 2002, 19-52. 
32 Note:  The specific speed that a waveform traverses a medium is affected by the medium itself, but 
for general purposes, EM signals propagate at approximately the speed of light. 
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human meaning such as the encoding of ones and zeroes into the frequency, amplitude, or 
phase of an EM signal for digital electronics.  Examples include but are not limited to 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standards (like IEEE 802.11 for 
Ethernet or IEEE 802.11g for wireless Ethernet), operating systems (like Windows XP, 
Mac OS, or Unix), network operating systems (like Cisco), network protocols (like 
TCP/IP [Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol]), programs, programming 
languages (like C++, Java, ActiveX, Hypertext Markup Language [HTML]), database 
protocols (like Standard Query Language [SQL]), etc.  These rules are not unlike those 
governing other warfighting domains such as air traffic control rules, driving rules, sea 
navigation rules, etc.  The Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) model provides a useful 
framework for categorizing these rules as they pertain to communications (see Figure 2).  
All electronics were built by humans, and these rules were built into them.  Since these 
are human-made rules, they can be changed by replacing or updating hardware and/or 
software.  Unlike the physical laws, these rules can sometimes be bent or broken. 
 
 
Figure 2.   OSI Model (From 33) 
 
                                                 
33 “OSI Model,” Huffman Reference Materials, 
http://www.huffmanreference.com/pdf_download.html, last accessed Nov 20, 2007. 
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2. Weapons in Cyberspace (Cyberweapons) 
In the classical warfighting domains, military forces employ weapons in order to 
attack or defend against an adversary.  This is no different in cyberspace; however, the 
term cyberweapon has been utilized in many circumstances where it is inappropriate 
and/or inaccurate.  Such misuse characterizes almost everything as a cyberweapon and 
thus nothing is a cyberweapon.  What is required is a return to a foundational definition 
of weapon as “any instrument or means which is used for one's own [defense] or for 
attacking others."34  Closely related, a weapon system is defined as "a combination of one 
or more weapons with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of 
delivery and deployment required for self-sufficiency."35  Examples of classical weapons 
and weapon systems are knives, guns, cannons, missiles, rockets, electronic warfare 
jammers, anti-aircraft artillery, tanks, fighter aircraft, bombers, warships, bombs, mines, 
weapons of mass destruction, etc.  In several select cases, the term weapon is preceded by 
a particular domain in which said weapon is primarily employed, such as an air weapon 
or space weapon.  To ensure the term cyberweapon is used properly, it is necessary to 
further define the key attributes that distinguish a weapon from other implements of war. 
A simple "ready, aim, fire" test can be used to quickly determine whether or not 
an object is a weapon; note that the object must pass all three criteria to be a weapon.  For 
the "ready" test, the object must be deliberately employed by a person or persons 
(typically a combatant).  For the "aim" test, the object must be designed to target an 
adversary with the intent to cause harm.  For the "fire" test, the object must transfer mass 
and/or energy to said adversary target with the intent to cause damage such as injury, 
death, destruction, disruption, blinding, etc.  A weapon can be used for attack and/or 
defensive purposes, and a weapon is typically technological in nature. 
Using this definition, an initial list of cyberweapons in existence today can now 
be derived to include logic bombs; Domain Name Service (DNS) attack code; Denial of 
Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) code; malicious logic (Trojans, 
Viruses, Worms, Bots/Botnets/Zombies, hacking scripts, etc.), vulnerability exploitation 
                                                 
34 Dictionary.com, Kernerman English Multilingual Dictionary, K Dictionaries Ltd., 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/weapon, last accessed Sept 9, 2007. 
35 JP 1-02, 582. 
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code, along with existing electronic warfare weapons like communications jammers.36  
Cyberweapons are as real as their classical counterparts.  Note that the attacks and end 
effects themselves are not weapons but are instead the damage caused by weapons.  For 
example, operators cannot “fire” a web defacement, DoS, or remote system shutdown; 
instead, they can “fire” a weapon in the form of malicious code, scripts, etc. that can 
result in these damaging effects. 
 
3. Fortifications in Cyberspace 
In the classical warfighting domains, military forces build fortifications in order to 
fend off adversary forces in order to protect friendly forces, territory, or targets.  
Fortifications are defined as "military works constructed for the purpose of strengthening 
a position."37  Classical examples include walls, fences, fortresses, castles, star bastions, 
De-Militarized Zones (DMZs), moats, no-mans-land, mine fields, and so forth.38  Key 
attributes that distinguish fortifications from weapons include: 1) they establish a 
defensive perimeter and control access into the perimeter (allowing friendly forces to 
enter and exit while preventing adversaries from entering), 2) they are often used to 
bolster the defensibility of the existing terrain, especially if the terrain is flat, 3) they are 
designed to absorb damage so as to protect what is inside, 4) they are often designed to 
employ patrols and weapons in such as manner as to maximize the effectiveness of the 
friendly weapons against an attacking force, and 5) said defenses can be layered (referred 
to as defense-in-depth).  Based upon this definition, the following items in cyberspace are 
fortifications (and not weapons):  firewalls, proxy servers, web and spam filters, mail 
relays, antivirus/antimalware software, router Access Control Lists (ACLs), cryptography 
and encryption, user access controls (such as Username/Password authentication, Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI), Certificates, access cards, group policies, digital signatures, 
                                                 
36 This list of example cyberspace weapons was derived and consolidated from multiple sections in 
Dorothy E. Denning, Information Warfare and Security, Berkeley, CA:  ACM Press Books, 1999.  This is 
not an all inclusive list. 
37 Dictionary.com, Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1), Random House, Inc., 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/fortification, last accessed Sept 9, 2007. 
38 Thomas J. Pingel, “Key Defensive Terrain in Cyberspace:  A Geographic Perspective,” Proceedings 
of the 2003 International Conference on Politics and Information Systems: Technologies and Applications, 
Orlando, FL, 2003, 159-163, http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~pingel/, last accessed Aug 6, 2007. 
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etc.).39  In the analog realm, fortifications also include anti-jamming, shielding, jam 
resistance, and so forth.  Cyberspace fortifications are as real as their classical 
counterparts, and cyberspace fortifications are not to be confused with cyberweapons. 
 
4. Reconnaissance and Movement in Cyberspace 
Operational movement in cyberspace is dictated by the characteristics of the 
cyberspace domain.  For example, travel through IP-enabled (Internet Protocol-enabled) 
portions of cyberspace is governed by various rules at the first four layers of the OSI 
model such as TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) and the 
correlating physical layer and data link layer IEEE standards.  Since EM signals travel at 
approximately the speed of light, adversary forces can conduct extremely long-range 
reconnaissance in cyberspace against enemy cyberspace targets.  This long-range 
reconnaissance is akin to having U-2s, Globalhawks, and Predators with sensors capable 
of seeing the other side of the globe.  Cyberspace reconnaissance can be conducted solely 
in cyberspace; however, a more effective approach would be to use all source intelligence 
to collect information across all domains against key cyberspace targets in preparation for 
attacks.  The all source method is already used across the four classical warfighting 
domains, and no credible reason presents itself to not follow suit with cyberspace.  At 
first glance, it would seem that reconnaissance in cyberspace would provide equal 
opportunities for both friendly and adversary forces; however, cyberspace provides 
nearly limitless fast avenues of approach, making the discovery of adversary 
reconnaissance difficult and challenging.  Reconnaissance by fire techniques can also be 
used to probe fortifications and defenses for weaknesses.  Finally, automation can help 
speed the process of probing defenses for weaknesses. 
Once sufficient information is collected, an adversary can conduct operational 
maneuvers to launch an attack campaign through cyberspace via many avenues of 
approach.  Since combined arms tactics are doctrinally accepted as the best method of 
employing military force, the same should hold true for employing forces in cyberspace.  
                                                 
39 This list of example cyberspace fortifications was derived and consolidated from multiple sections 
in Dorothy E. Denning, Information Warfare and Security, Berkeley, CA:  ACM Press Books, 1999.  This 
is not an all inclusive list. 
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Once cyberspace defenses have been compromised and a military installation infiltrated 
(in cyberspace, as well as in the other four domains), enemy forces have just maneuvered 
into friendly cyberspace.  From this point forward, the infiltrating force must 
systematically navigate, defeat, or circumvent any active and passive defenses to 
continue the assault.  Of note, the defending force may be completely unaware that the 
attack has even happened as long as the attacker has not triggered any alarms or been 
spotted by patrols (if they have any).  Once access to primary targets has been gained, the 
adversary can deliver the payload, whether it is destruction, disruption, exfiltration of 
intelligence, deception, usurping command and control, etc. either for the effect alone or 
better yet in support of combined arms tactics for a larger offensive campaign. 
If the defending force detects the assault, then defenders have some options.  The 
Defend-Relocate-Augment-Withdraw-Delay (referred to in military doctrine as 
DRAWD) provides a general defensive framework to counter an attack.  Defenders can 
defend by building up additional fortifications (such as updating firewalls to block IP 
addresses, updating proxy servers to block web sites, etc.) and/or patching holes in the 
fortifications (updating antivirus on outdated systems and running antivirus scans), 
relocating network segments or moving to different portions of EM spectrum (for 
example, switching frequencies, satellite channels, and the like), withdrawing by shutting 
down or disconnecting machines or entire network segments, or delaying attackers with a 
mixture of the above methods.  The offensive option, which would be available during 
times of war, would involve employing an attacking force to destroy or disrupt the 




Domain Land Sea Air Space Cyberspace
Made of Earth Water Air Vacuum Electronics & 
Electromagnetic (EM) 
Spectrum
Lead Service Army Navy Air Force Air Force None
Operational Doctrine 
and Developments
METT-T … Future 
Combat System & Future 
Force Warrior
Power Projection & Sea 
Control …
Sea Shield, Sea Strike & 
Sea Basing
Global Reach/Power, Air 
Superiority (Tenants of Air 
Power) … Interdependent 
Fight
Operational Responsive 





Gravity and Friction Gravity, Buoyancy, and 
Fluid Dynamics
Gravity and Aerodynamics Gravity and Orbital 
Mechanics
EM Physics
Physical Dimensions & 
Degrees of Freedom
2 (fwd-back, left-right) 2 or 3 (fwd-back, left-
right, up-down 
[subsurface])
3 (fwd-back, left-right, up-
down)
3 (fwd-back, left-right, 
up-down )…constrained 
to orbital mechanics
3 (fwd-back, left-right, up-
down)
Natural Obstructions to 
Movement
Elevation, Bodies of 
Water, and Rough Terrain
Bodies of Land and 
Shallow Water
Air Density and Elevated 
Terrain (Mountains/Hills)
Atmosphere Physical Obstructions to 
Signal Propagation, Breaks 
in Connectivity, Bandwidth 
and Throughput 
Constraints
Combat Range/Radius Tens to Hundreds of miles Thousands of miles Hundreds to Thousands of 
miles
Tens of thousands of 
miles+
Signal Power (Extended by 
Network Connectivity)
Movement Speed 0-50 mph 0-50 knots 0-Mach 2+ 0-35K mph+ Speed of Light, Signal 
Bandwidth, and Data 
Throughput Rate
Forces, Weapons, and 
Fortifications (Typical 
examples)
Infantry (Guns, Grenades, 
Mortars, RPGs),  Artillery 
(Cannons, Rockets, 
Missiles), Tanks (Guns, 
Cannons, Rockets), 
Helicopters (Guns, 




Hovercraft, Patrol Craft 
(Machine Guns, Cannons, 
Missiles, Rockets, Depth 
Charges), Armor
Fighters, Bombers, 
Helicopters (Machine Guns, 
Cannons, Missiles, Rockets, 












Table 2.   Warfighting Domain Attributes Comparison 
 
E. INITIAL OBSERVATIONS 
Consolidating the results of the above analysis about the doctrinal attributes of 
cyberspace with the Warfighting Domain Analytical framework produces Table 2.  Based 
upon these features, additional doctrinal implications can be derived to reveal whether or 
not the warfighting domain of cyberspace is sufficiently similar to that of the air domain.  
The interplay between weapons, terrain, fortifications, movement, and maneuver shall be 
analyzed to determine similarities and differences between the cyber and air domains. 
 
1. Terrain, Operational Movement, and Operational Maneuver 
With the continuing proliferation of digital electronics, the WWW, and Internet-
enabled devices, much of the digital portion of cyberspace can be visualized as being flat 
with “oceans” separating physically disconnected networks.  Due to the continued 
proliferation of network technology, bridging these “oceans” between networks is 
becoming increasingly easy with network bridges, portable storage devices, “sneakernet,” 
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and the like.  The TCP/IP Protocol was originally designed to openly and easily connect 
as many machines as possible, which tends to flatten cyberspace terrain and make 
maneuver easy.  Mountains or hills do exist in cyberspace in the form of signal 
bandwidth and data throughput constraints which make traversing certain cyberspace 
paths more difficult (like climbing uphill).  In addition, physical terrain has a direct 
impact upon the cyberspace domain in the form of signal obstructions and signal 
attenuation.  Additional variations in cyberspace terrain are provided by man-made 
fortifications.  Combined with the fact that cyberspace is constantly growing and 
expanding, the number of locations from which cyberspace attacks can come from and 
the number of combinations of network connection options available to aggressors is 
continuously growing.  Also, as TCP/IP technology spreads and connects more electronic 
devices across the globe, the “oceans” separating networks will continue to shrink.  
Therefore, digital connectivity across the globe equates to global range.  Since digital 
signals travel at the speed of light, the ability to move and maneuver globally through 
cyberspace in a matter of seconds enables border and boundary crossings in a matter of 
seconds.  Thus in cyberspace, people (including combatants and non-combatants) can 
cross sovereign country borders very quickly for operational movement or maneuver.  
Likewise, fortifications of military installations in cyberspace are only seconds away.  
Speed and reach are thus the dominant factors in regards to cyberspace attacks and 
cyberspace power.  Under these conditions, the Area of Operations for Computer 
Network Operations is by definition global.  These features make operations in the 
cyberspace domain more similar to the conduct of operations in the air domain. 
 
2. Man-Made Terrain 
Since much of cyberspace is man-made, it is by definition subject to change.  As 
such, the terrain of cyberspace is constantly changing with new hardware and software.  
This feature allows for creating new cyberspace terrain or destroying it.  “Oceans” in 
cyberspace can be spanned or filled with the introduction of new hardware and/or 
software.  This feature is unique among the other warfighting domains and provides both 
opportunities and vulnerabilities.  The ability to create or destroy cyberspace terrain must 
be considered a vital component of cyberspace power and thus cyber warfare doctrine. 
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3. Cyberweapons 
Currently, no open source defensive digital weapons currently exist as defined in 
this paper.  That is, no weapons exist that are designed to “shoot down” incoming 
cyberspace intruders just as Anti-Aircraft Artillery, Surface-to-Air Missiles, or fighter 
interceptors can shoot down an incoming enemy aircraft.  This feature gives attacking 
forces an advantage, and this feature currently makes the defense of cyberspace more 
challenging.  From the defenders perspective, the defensive options available are 1) to 
attack the intruders at their home base (an offensive counter cyber mission analogous to 
offensive counterair mission defined in existing air power doctrine), 2) to “hack back” 
adversary cyber attacks to determine the source, 3) to absorb enemy weapons effects with 
fortifications, 4) to move out of the way of the intruders’ weapons, 5) to delay intruders, 
6) to repair and reconstitute in the event defenses give way, or 7) to implement a 
combination of these options.  These features make operations in the cyberspace domain 
comparable to that of the air domain.  Of course, the advent of true defensive 
cyberweapons that could shoot down inbound cyber intruders would help to level this 
playing field considerably. 
 
4. Cyberspace Fortifications and Operational Maneuver 
Since no open source defensive digital weapon exist, cyberspace fortifications 
must currently stand on their own in order to defend a given portion of cyberspace 
against adversarial attack.  However, cyberspace also interconnects various military 
installations at the speed of light, and these connections result in reducing the maximum 
strength of all interconnected fortifications to that of the weakest point among them all.  
In layman's terms, if two castles are connected by an underground tunnel, an attacker 
only needs to defeat the fortifications of the weaker castle in order to defeat the 
fortifications of both.  Furthermore, defensive maneuvers in cyberspace are typically 
limited to the friendly system and/or network boundary of the base/enterprise (where 
defenders have the system administrator or network authority to employ fortifications and 
operationally maneuver).  This is in stark contrast to the attackers vast operational 
maneuver space.  Friendly forces could theoretically counterattack the source of the 
adversary assault; unfortunately, these countermeasures typically depend upon timely 
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situational awareness of the cyberspace attack and its source, which typically is not 
available.  Since no defensive digital weapons exist to shoot down incoming attackers, 
this disparity in maneuverability leans heavily in favor of the attacking force and severely 
hampers the defense.  Finally, defensive maneuvers are severely slowed by insufficient 
situational awareness, which hinders the ability to plan and execute effective 
countermeasures.  These features are not unlike those associated with the defense of air 
bases and thus makes defensive operations in cyberspace comparable to defensive 
operations in the air domain  Finally, the development of new methods to enable cyber 
forces to operationally maneuver across friendly cyberspace would provide friendly 
forces with the capability to concentrate defensive power against invaders as is 
doctrinally captured in existing defensive counterair doctrine, thereby making cyber 
defense even more comparable to air defense. 
 
5. Force Augmentation in Cyberspace 
Currently, no reliable methods exist which enable defending forces to 
operationally move or maneuver along interior lines to concentrate resources to repel 
incoming attacks at the point of attack.  That is, cyber defenders at Base X cannot be 
readily moved or maneuvered in cyberspace to effectively come to the aid of Base Y that 
is under attack due to network security policies and limitations across defensive 
boundaries.  As core services continue to centralize and manpower reduced, this has the 
effect of reducing the overall cyberspace defense capacity of friendly forces. 
 
6. Requirement for Jointness 
Of worthy note, these definitions and attributes of the cyberspace warfighting 
domain do not expose or delineate any significant differences regarding the Army’s, 
Navy’s, Air Force’s, or Marine’s portions of military cyberspace.  Cyberspace attacks 
and cyberspace defense requirements are not unique by or across services.  This begs the 
question as to why each service currently conducts cyberspace operations differently, 
which creates unnecessary and exploitable seems in operations.  Furthermore, these 
differences can be seen across different Combatant Commands and even within the 
services themselves.  The net effect is the creation and proliferation of unnecessary seams 
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in the DoD’s cyberspace defense operations that adversaries can readily and continually 
exploit.  Therefore, Joint Doctrine for cyberspace operations is vital to unity of effort in 
the defense of military cyberspace. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
By comparing and contrasting the domain of cyberspace to that of the classical 
warfighting domains of air, land, sea, and space, it is evident that of these four domains 
cyberspace is most similar to the air domain.  Attributes such as the speed of operations, 
distance of effects, vastness of areas of operations, the permeability of 
borders/boundaries, degrees of freedom/maneuver, difficulty in building massive 
fortifications are shared between the air and cyberspace domains.  There are also notable 
differences between the attributes of these two domains that must not be discounted and 
are worthy of further research.  The second closest match is the space domain; however, 
certain features of the space domain do not lend themselves to useful doctrinal 
comparison of the cyberspace domain.  Namely, the historical record does not provide 
much material on “space wars” from which to draw historical lessons learned that could 
be applied to cyber warfare doctrine.  For the purposes of this thesis, the warfighting 
domain of cyberspace is sufficiently similar to that of the air domain to draw credible 
lessons from the historical development of defensive air power doctrine that can be 
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III. BATTLE OF BRITAIN:   
THE FIRST INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSES 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
World War II (WWII) began in the European theater on September 1, 1939, when 
Germany invaded Poland and incited Great Britain and France to declare war.  Between 
September 1939 and May 1940, Germany had successfully seized control of Denmark 
and Norway, and by June 1940, the combined military forces of Germany and Italy had 
successfully seized control of France and effectively driven all remaining British forces 
off the European mainland.  These events set the stage for the Battle of Britain as the first 
great air battle in history.  On one side of the war sat Great Britain alone, and on the other 
side sat the formidable Germany military.  Flanked to the east and south and 
outnumbered, Great Britain was forced to make a last stand against the oncoming 
German invasion.  Over the course of the next four months (July to October 1940), the 
Royal Air Force (RAF) successfully defended the skies over the Isles against the 
formidable German Air Force (Luftwaffe), thereby preventing German military forces 
from invading their homeland and inspiring Sir Winston Churchill to say, "Never in the 
field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."40 
Despite having taken heavy losses over the course of four long months, the RAF 
was able to successfully defend Great Britain's skies against the Luftwaffe’s formidable 
offensive air campaign by maintaining British air superiority, which thereby limited the 
damage of Luftwaffe raids and denied the German military of the air cover it desperately 
needed in order to successfully launch an amphibious invasion across the English 
Channel.  This chapter shall explore how the isolated, outnumbered, and surrounded RAF 
had effectively employed air power to not only defeat the larger and lethal Luftwaffe but 
also the entire German war machine attempting to invade England. 
 
                                                 
40 "Background to the Battle of Britain," The Battle of Britain History Site, 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html, last accessed Feb 6, 2007. 
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1. Commander’s Intent 
In 1940, Hitler’s aspirations to invade Great Britain had become increasingly self-
evident.  Although the particular method and route of the German invasion was the 
subject of much debate, Sir Winston Churchill anticipated that the Luftwaffe would play 
a major role in this assault and had charged the RAF with building a fighter and bomber 
force sufficient enough to “[break] the enemy’s attack.”41  Having been driven off the 
European mainland, British military forces were incapable of launching any major 
offensive campaign to stave off the coming invasion.  For the RAF, this meant that their 
mission would be to disrupt the Luftwaffe’s ability to support or enable the invasion.  At 
best, the RAF would have to maintain air superiority over the Isles, and if they could not, 
then the RAF would have to deny air superiority to the enemy.  Failure to do so would 
mean that German surface forces would be free to maneuver and launch their air/sea 
invasion without risk of being struck from the air.  It would also mean that the Royal 
Navy and British ground forces would be at risk of attacks from the Luftwaffe.  The 
major unknown was how long Great Britain’s defenses would have to hold against 
German aggression in order to successfully repel the invasion.  In short, a failure to 
defend British skies would be the prelude to a successful German invasion. 
 
2. Terrain 
The geographic situation of Great Britain prior to and during the Battle of Britain 
was of great concern to British war planners.  With German military forces arrayed along 
the northern coastal regions of mainland Europe just on the other side of the English 
Channel, most British urban centers and the capital city of London were within striking 
range of German air power.  This fact dictated that the area of responsibility for the RAF 
would cover all of the British Isles and all possible Luftwaffe approaches.  Britain’s 
saving grace was that German ground forces would have to successfully cross the English 
Channel in order to land sufficient forces to invade and secure England, and during this 
transition across the Channel, German ground forces would be vulnerable to attack from 
the Royal Navy and the RAF.  Thus, the English Channel served as an effective 
obstruction to German Blitzkrieg tactics which had been so effective during Germany’s 
                                                 
41Len Deighton, Battle of Britain, 77. 
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march across Europe.  In this situation, Britain also enjoyed the home field advantage and 
had entrenched its defense forces across the island to fend off any potential German 
invaders, although equipment, training, and readiness were questionable and problematic.  
At sea, the Royal Navy was among the best in the world and held a significant advantage 
over German naval forces, especially after the German Navy suffered heavy losses during 
previous campaigns.  At best, the Royal Navy would enjoy greater freedom of maneuver; 
at worst, the seas would be contested territory.  From the German perspective, Germany 
had to defeat the Royal Navy as a prelude to landing their ground forces.  If the Royal 
Navy was not neutralized, then their invasion forces on some 3,000 barges and 155 
transports would be vulnerable to attacks by the formidable Royal Navy.  Since the 
German Navy was not up to this task after losing half of its destroyers during the 
Norwegian campaign, the Luftwaffe was called upon to attack the Royal Navy from the 
air.  This fact made the maintenance of British air superiority and the denial of German 
air superiority all the more critical as a precondition for keeping the German invasion at 
bay.  Lastly, Britain was isolated and surrounded with German forces arrayed from the 
southwest in France all the way to the northeast in Norway as illustrated in Figure 3.  The 
RAF had to be prepared to repel attacking air forces from many directions.42 
 
 
Figure 3.   Situation Map:  Eve of the Battle of Britain in WWII (From 43) 
                                                 
42 Len Deighton, Battle of Britain, 82-87, 98-99 and Frank W. Heilenday, The Battle of Britain —  
Luftwaffe vs. RAF:  Lessons Learned and Lingering Myths from World War II (P-7915), Santa Monica, 
CA:  RAND, 1995, 1-2. 
43 Peter Townsend, Duel of Eagles:  The Greatest Book on the Battle of Britain Ever Written, Edison, 
NY:  Castle Books, 2003, xi. 
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3. Enemy Forces (Luftwaffe) and Friendly Forces (RAF) 
In the summer of 1940, the German military held a significant but not 
overwhelming advantage in numbers of troops, tanks, and aircraft against the British (see 
Table 4 , Appendix D).  The Germans had nearly a 2-to-1 advantage in ground troop 
strength, nearly a 6-to-1 advantage in tanks (factoring in that only 103 of Britain’s tanks 
were capable of defeating German Panzers), and close to a 3-to-1 advantage in combat 
aircraft.  Whereas the German military forces were well equipped, trained, and supplied, 
the British military was struggling to recruit, train, and equip sufficient troops for the 
defense of Britain in such a short time period.  Factoring in aircraft serviceability, the 
Luftwaffe had 824 fighters to Britain’s 507 and 1,017 bombers to Britain’s meager 84 
(see Table 5 , Appendix E).  The only advantage that the RAF held over the Luftwaffe 
was that they had more fighter pilots with 1,402 British pilots to Germany’s 906 (see 
Table 6 , Appendix E).  British and German air forces were arrayed and positioned as 
illustrated in  Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Situation Map:  British and German Air Forces (From 44) 
 
                                                 
44 Len Deighton, Battle of Britain, 98-99. 
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B. DEFENDING BRITISH SKIES 
In analyzing the RAF’s defense of Britain, the factors of command and control, 
operational employment, and technology employment shall be evaluated as they 
pertained to the United Kingdom’s success in the Battle of Britain against the Luftwaffe. 
 
1. Technology Employment 
By 1940, the RAF was a very modern and well-equipped air force competing 
against the equally modern and equipped Luftwaffe.  Since World War I and in the run 
up to WWII, Britain had invested resources in creating a modern air force which included 
cutting edge fighters, bombers, radar systems, and the defense industrial base needed to 
support them.  Though outnumbered, the RAF would leverage technology to assist them 
in denying the Luftwaffe air superiority over Britain.  A more detailed analysis is 
required to reveal the factors that contributed to the RAF’s success. 
 
a. Aircraft 
In 1940, Germany’s most advanced fighters were the Messerschmitt  
Me-109 (officially named the Bayerische Flugzeugwerke or Bf-109) and Me-110; 
Britain’s were the Superman Spitfire and Hawker Hurricane (see Figure 5).  The fighters 
of both nations took advantage of cutting edge technology of the time, but the German 
Me-109 was arguably the best fighter in the world.  Regarding armaments, Luftwaffe 
fighters held the edge with higher caliber forward guns capable of hitting targets at 
greater distances.  RAF Spitfires and Hurricanes were typically armed only with eight 
.303-inch guns which had difficulty penetrating armor installed on German fighters and 
bombers, while Luftwaffe Me-109s and Me-110s were both equipped with two 20 mm 
cannons which carried more punch and had longer range.  In addition, Me-109s carried 
two 7.92 mm machine guns, and Me-110s carried six 7.92 mm machine guns and a rear 
gun.  Later versions of the Spitfire would eventually be outfitted with two 20 mm 
cannons to help even the odds.  Me-109s and Me-110s also had more powerful engines 
than their RAF opponents and thus could outclimb and outdive RAF Spitfires and 
Hurricanes.  Me-109s also had fuel injected engines which enabled them to continue 
operating under negative gravity pushovers; in contrast, the non-fuel-injected British 
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fighters had to roll over first before diving to avoid starving their engines of fuel.  The 
Me-109 was also outfitted with a supercharger that gave it a decisive performance edge at 
heights above 20,000 feet against all RAF fighters.  The advantage that the RAF fighters 
had over Luftwaffe fighters was that both the Spitfire and Hurricane were more 
maneuverable and could turn tighter in a dogfight.  The biggest drawback of the Me-109 
was its limited range and endurance which provided only about 15 minutes of combat 
time over southern England despite being forward based near the English Channel.  The 
Me-110’s primary drawback was that it was so unmaneuverable that it could not dogfight 
with British fighters, and its anticipated range and endurance proved disappointing under 
combat conditions.  In summary, the Luftwaffe had an edge in technological capabilities 
over the RAF going into the Battle of Britain, but this edge was by no means decisive.45 
 
Figure 5.   Me-109, Spitfire, Me-110, and Hurricane (From 46) 
                                             (top left and right)  (bottom left and right) 
 
b. Radar 
The Battle of Britain and WWII brought technological changes that would 
forever transform military defenses by extending human senses beyond their bodily limits 
in order to anticipate, sense, and thus defeat an adversary at a distance.  In the 1930s, 
both Germany and Britain had experimented with systems that could detect radio waves 
                                                 
45 Frank Heilenday, The Battle of Britain -- Luftwaffe vs. RAF:  Lessons Learned and Lingering Myths 
from World War II (P-7915), 3-6; "Aircraft of the Battle of Britain," The Battle of Britain History Site, 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html, last accessed Feb 6, 2007; and Richard Overy, The Battle 
of Britain:  The Myth and the Reality, 38-40, 56-60. 
46 "Aircraft of the Battle of Britain," The Battle of Britain History Site, 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html, last accessed Feb 6, 2007. 
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reflected or re-radiated from distant aircraft.  The Brits called their system Radio 
Detection Finding (RDF), but today we would recognize and call this system radar 
(RAdio Detection And Ranging).  By 1939, German experiments with radar were further 
along than Britain’s; however, Britain was more successful at operationalizing radar to 
give the RAF improved situational awareness, which they would then translate into 
tactical and operational successes (see Figure 6).  The operationalization of radar 
included the employment of radar technology combined with the proper mix of 
operational C2, doctrine, tactics, and training that translated their enhanced situational 
awareness into combat power on the battlefield. 
 
    
Figure 6.   Chain Home Radar Antenna and British Radar Stations (From 47) 
 
Prior to the Battle of Britain, Britain had successfully built and manned 22 
“Chain Home” radar stations (each with three 350-foot transmitting antennas and four 
240-foot receiving antennas operating at 22-52 MHz radio frequency to detect inbound 
aircraft as far as 100 miles beyond the coast), 22 “Chain Home Low” radar stations (each 
with rotating aerial antennas on 185-foot towers operating near 200 MHz to more 
                                                 
47 “Document 12:  The Radar Document,” Battle of Britain Historical Society, 
http://www.battlebritain.net, last accessed Feb 10, 2007. 
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precisely track low-flying aircraft up to 80 miles away as well as ships in the English 
Channel), and 5 combined radar stations that operated both systems (see Figure 6).  Since 
all British radar systems faced seaward, they could not “see” aircraft after they had 
crossed the British coastline.  These radar stations provided the RAF with near-real-time 
information on all aircraft approaching the British coast, while the overland radar 
coverage gap would be filled by the Royal Observer Corps.  This wealth of information 
would require a process and organization that could collect and analyze all radar and 
observer information, sort out friendly and enemy aircraft, and then communicate with 
friendly fighters to direct intercepts to enemy aircraft.  These issues will be covered in 
sections B.2 and B.3 of this chapter.  This technology, combined with the proper 
operational C2 and operational employment gave the RAF a significant battlefield 
advantage in defending the skies over Great Britain.48 
 
c. Ground-based Air Defenses 
British ground-based air defenses primarily consisted of Anti-Aircraft 
(AA) guns (see Figure 7).  At the beginning of the Battle of Britain, over 130 AA 
batteries under the Army’s Anti-Aircraft Command were positioned to protect vital 
British centers such as the RAF headquarters, the Rolls-Royce works at Derby, the 
Bristol aircraft works, Royal Navy bases, key towns, and RAF airfields.  AA gun sites 
were linked to the RAF Fighter Control System which provided AA gunners situational 
awareness on inbound enemy aircraft and coordinated between airborne defenses (e.g. 
fighter intercepts) and ground-based defenses (e.g. AA guns).  The primary drawback to 
the AA guns was their lack of mobility which inhibited their ability to be moved in 
adjustment to changing German tactics and targets.  In addition to the AA guns, ground-
based air defenses also included a network of 1,466 barrage balloons under the command 
of the RAF that were tethered around vital targets to discourage low-flying bombers from 
approaching.  These balloons were a deterrent to Luftwaffe pilots, especially at night, but 
they were also very susceptible to changes in the weather.  Alone, these ground-based air 
                                                 
48 Len Deighton, Battle of Britain, 62-63; "The RAF Fighter Control System," The Battle of Britain 
History Site, http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html, last accessed Feb 6, 2007; and Frank 
Heilenday, The Battle of Britain -- Luftwaffe vs. RAF:  Lessons Learned and Lingering Myths from World 
War II (P-7915), 13-15. 
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defenses stood little chance of countering Luftwaffe attacks or destroying many enemy 
aircraft.  Used in concert with RAF air power, however, ground-based air defenses would 
add to the battlefield chaos that enemy pilots would have to endure during their attacks.49 
 
    
Figure 7.   British Anti-Aircraft Gun and Crew (From 50) 
 
d. Military Readiness 
Overall, the RAF did a poor job of readying RAF pilots for a long, drawn 
out air defense campaign.  Luftwaffe pilots were typically more skilled in air-to-air 
engagements, had been superbly trained, and many Luftwaffe pilots were experienced 
combat veterans from the Poland, France, and Spain campaigns.  In contrast, the RAF 
had sent their best pilots to bomber squadrons during the interwar years, leaving the 
fighter squadrons to depend upon reservists and the auxiliary for pilot manpower.  Thus, 
British fighter pilots were typically under-trained and none had been formally trained in 
aerial gunnery.  In addition, dated British fighter tactics of flying in tight “Vee” 
formations were combat ineffective against Luftwaffe fighter tactics, and it was not for 
several months (and many downed aircraft and pilots) that the RAF would learn and 
adapt their tactics to match the Luftwaffe.  Nevertheless, the RAF sustained several 
pipelines for recruiting and training pilots to include the RAF College Cranwell, the RAF  
 
 
                                                 
49 Frank Heilenday, The Battle of Britain -- Luftwaffe vs. RAF:  Lessons Learned and Lingering Myths 
from World War II (P-7915), 7-10 and Len Deighton, Battle of Britain, 62-63, 179-185. 
50 "The RAF Fighter Control System," The Battle of Britain History Site, 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html, last accessed Feb 6, 2007 and Len Deighton, Battle of 
Britain, 69. 
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Volunteer Reserve, and the Halton Apprentices’ School.  Over the course of the war, 
successful pilots would share their combat experiences with their peers to improve their 
tactical proficiency in the air.51 
RAF ground crews performed remarkably throughout WWII in preparing 
and repairing combat aircraft for operations.  A returning RAF fighter could typically be 
inspected for damage, refueled, rearmed, and launched within 10-35 minutes while the 
pilot was being debriefed before the next sortie.  Combined with their endurance 
advantage over Britain (75 minutes combat time for RAF fighters versus 15 minutes for 
Luftwaffe fighters), this level of sortie generation was critical to multiplying the limited 
RAF combat aircraft into more combat sorties and thus more combat power.  Lastly, by 
the summer of 1940, Britain had already ramped up its defense industrial base for aircraft 
production and repair in anticipation of taking heavy losses defending Britain.  This 
industrial mobilization and reconstitution capacity would prove vital to the RAF’s 
capability to sustain a long air defense campaign against the formidable Luftwaffe.52 
 
2. Operational Command and Control 
Under the leadership of Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding and scientific civil 
servant Henry Tizard, the RAF successfully developed, tested, exercised, and then 
implemented an integrated air defense system which included radar sites, control centers, 
airfields, observer stations, and ground-based air defenses across the British Isles. 
 
a. Unified Control and Unified Effort 
The fundamental principles of centralized control and decentralized 
execution laid the foundation of an effective, unified, and coordinated air defense effort.  
Note that administratively, the various components of military forces defending British 
skies were assigned under separate chains of command (for example, ground-based air 
                                                 
51 Len Deighton, Battle of Britain, 32-39, 93-94, 110-111 and Frank Heilenday, The Battle of Britain -
- Luftwaffe vs. RAF:  Lessons Learned and Lingering Myths from World War II (P-7915), 13, 18-19, 64, 
141, 164-165. 
52 Len Deighton, Battle of Britain, 32-39, 93-94, 110-111 and Frank Heilenday, The Battle of Britain -
- Luftwaffe vs. RAF:  Lessons Learned and Lingering Myths from World War II (P-7915), 13, 18- 19, 64, 
141, 164-165. 
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defenses were under the Army’s Anti-Aircraft Command, fighters were under the RAF 
Fighter Command, bombers were under the RAF Bomber Command, observers were 
under the Royal Observer Corps, and so forth).  Operationally, however, the efforts of 
these military forces were fused in a simple yet effective operational C2 system called the 
RAF Fighter Control System (see Figure 8).  The RAF Fighter Control System integrated 
tactical information from across all air defense forces to produce an operational-level 
common operating picture and shared this “Big Picture” with lower level Group and 
Sector Control centers which thereby translated this knowledge advantage into the 
coordinated application of air and ground based defensive combat power.53 
 
 
Figure 8.   Operational C2 - the RAF Fighter Control System (From 54) 
 
b. Awareness, Centralized Control, and Decentralized Execution 
Britain was divided into four regions (see Figure 4), and each region was 
assigned to a Group Control center.  Each group was further subdivided into sectors, and 
each Sector Control controlled up to three squadrons of fighters, related airfields, AA 
guns, observer posts, and balloon barrages within that sector.  Each Sector Control would 
pass information (fighter status and enemy aircraft sightings from observation posts) up 
to Group Control.  Group Control would in turn consolidate information from several 
                                                 
53 British Air Ministry, The Battle of Britain, New York, NY:  Garden City Publishing Co., 1941, 6-
10; "The RAF Fighter Control System," The Battle of Britain History Site, 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html, last accessed Feb 6, 2007; and Len Deighton, Battle of 
Britain, 62-63, 119-120. 
54 "The RAF Fighter Control System," The Battle of Britain History Site, 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html, last accessed Feb 6, 2007. 
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Sector Controls and would forward this information to Headquarters Fighter Command.  
All radar reporting (range and bearing of enemy aircraft) was sent directly from all the 
Chain Home and Chain Home Low radar stations to Headquarters Fighter Command 
where it was combined with observations (including number, type, heading, and location 
of enemy aircraft) and to produce a common operational picture (see Figure 9).  This 
“Big Picture” would then be passed back down to Group Controls and Sector Controls, 
each of which would update their own maps.  Sector Controls would then scramble and 
vector fighters to intercept inbound enemy aircraft, direct AA guns along the inbound 
aircraft routes, and direct the balloon barrage to launch or adjust as required in 
preparation for the attack.  Each Sector Control would use Direction Finding (DF) radio 
stations on the ground with Identify-Friend-or-Foe (IFF) transponders aboard friendly 
aircraft (code named “Parrot”) to keep track of friendly and enemy aircraft in order to 
vector RAF fighters to intercept.  Between British radar and ground-observer tracking, 
Fighter Command could typically vector fighters to within 5 miles and 5,000 feet of the 
Luftwaffe intruders.  Lastly, once RAF fighter pilots visually detected the intruders, they 
would radio back number, type, position, course, and altitude to Sector Control, which 
would relay this information to update the common operating picture.55 
 
    
Figure 9.   RAF Plot Map and RAF Group Control Center (From 56) 
 
                                                 
55 British Air Ministry, The Battle of Britain, 6-10; "The RAF Fighter Control System," The Battle of 
Britain History Site, http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html, last accessed Feb 6, 2007; Len 
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Battle of Okinawa," Journal of Electronic Defense, 92-100; and “Document 14:  High Frequency Direction 
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56 "The RAF Fighter Control System," The Battle of Britain History Site, 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html, last accessed Feb 6, 2007. 
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c. Operational C2 Summary 
The results of this unified operational C2 structure were shared and timely 
situational awareness and a coordinated air/ground defense.  This improved awareness 
and teamwork significantly contributed to sustaining and drawing out the RAF’s air 
defense campaign despite the technological and numerical edge that the Luftwaffe 
enjoyed.  It would also limit Luftwaffe opportunities to surprise the RAF and enable HQ 
Fighter Command leaders to make better operational and strategic decisions regarding the 
air defense campaign of Great Britain. 
 
3. Operational Employment  
Although the RAF’s C2 structure of centralized operational control and 
decentralized tactical execution contributed significantly to tactical successes throughout 




In anticipation of a German invasion, the RAF superbly prepared their 
field forces to survive the inevitable Luftwaffe attacks.  Since the objective of the 
Luftwaffe was to destroy the RAF, RAF survivability became a driving factor to denying 
the Luftwaffe victory.  Using a combination of passive defenses to include camouflage, 
concealment, hardening (with anti-blast revetments), deception (with realistic dummy 
airfields and dummy aircraft), interference (with balloon barrage), and dispersal (by 
scrambling their aircraft once notified of an inbound attack in order to prevent them from 
being destroyed on the ground), the RAF made the Luftwaffe’s task of destroying their 
RAF combat power much more difficult.  Combined with rapid aircraft turnarounds and 
rapid runway repairs, the RAF could keep their aircraft in the air where their chances for 
survival greatly improved.  In addition, the RAF also kept all less experienced reserve 
fighter squadrons out of southern England and out of range of the deadly Luftwaffe Me-
109s.  Active defenses in the form of AA guns made it more difficult for fighters to strafe 
airfields and would cause Luftwaffe bombers to maneuver to avoid flak and thus reduce 
the accuracy of German bombs against British targets.  Finally, the hierarchical Fighter  
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Control System provided a measure of C2 redundancy so that the destruction of any 
given Sector Control center would have a negative impact but would not cripple air 
defense campaign operations.57 
 
b. Operational Maneuver 
Since the Luftwaffe did enjoy many tactical advantages in pilot skills, 
fighter aircraft performance, and sheer numbers, the RAF (Group 11 in particular) 
struggled for survival during the first month of the Battle of Britain while exacting a 
heavy cost against the Luftwaffe invaders.  Many RAF airfields and aircraft were 
destroyed and pilots were lost.  During this desperate hour, the pressure on Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding to either pull the RAF forces back north of the Thames or to 
throw all of the RAF reserve forces to the north into the fight continued to rise.  He 
resisted because pulling back RAF coverage of southern England would cede air 
superiority to the Luftwaffe, while throwing all RAF assets into the fight would risk 
losing them all.  Both of these outcomes would result in the Luftwaffe winning the air 
superiority they needed for the German invasion of England.  The RAF only had to deny 
the Luftwaffe air superiority and had to husband its resources in order to outlast the 
Luftwaffe; on the other hand, the Luftwaffe would have to destroy and defeat the RAF in 
order for Germany to prevail.58 
With their improved situational awareness, RAF Fighter Command was 
able to employ their limited fighter assets under more favorable battlefield conditions to 
counter the Luftwaffe’s tactical advantages.  The Luftwaffe employed deception tactics in 
an attempt to lure unwitting RAF pilots into air battles advantageous to the Luftwaffe; 
however, the RAF resisted such engagements and opted instead to wage a war of attrition 
that would take maximum advantage of Luftwaffe vulnerabilities.  For example, Fighter 
Command would task Hurricane fighters against bombers which did not have Me-109 
escorts in order to take advantage of Luftwaffe dive bomber vulnerabilities and stack the 
odds in favor of RAF fighters.  For German bombers that were escorted by Me-109s, 
                                                 
57 Frank Heilenday, The Battle of Britain -- Luftwaffe vs. RAF:  Lessons Learned and Lingering Myths 
from World War II (P-7915), 12-13 and Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain:  The Myth and the Reality, 
179-186, and Benjamin Cooling, ed., Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority, 140-155. 
58 Peter Townsend, Duel of Eagles, 309-326. 
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Spitfire units would be dispatched instead because they were more capable against and 
less vulnerable to these German fighters.  Furthermore, Spitfire pilots would take 
advantage of the Me-109’s limited endurance by keeping them engaged until they ran out 
of sufficient fuel to return to their home base.  These decisions would accumulate small 
tactical advantages into larger Luftwaffe aircraft and pilot losses over time and would 
buy time for the RAF to muster enough strength to challenge the Luftwaffe on the right 
battlefield.  All the while, Britain would continue to produce more aircraft and pilots 
while protecting its precious combat air forces.  Since Luftwaffe intruders could reach 
coastal targets within twenty minutes of being picked up on radar, Fighter Command 
used a mixture of three states of alert (Available, Readiness, and Standing by which could 
take off in twenty, five, and two minutes respectively) to ensure sufficient fighters of the 
correct type were prepared to intercept the enemy at any given time.  RAF doctrinaires 
that had favored massing RAF fighters to meet the Luftwaffe over southern England had 
failed to account for the large amount of time it would realistically take to assemble these 
large air formations, after which any Luftwaffe attack force would already have dropped 
their ordnance and started heading back to home base.  The RAF would have to bide their 
time until the proper situation presented itself and be cautious to always maintain 
sufficient reserves to sustain their defenses.59 
When the Luftwaffe changed their plans from targeting RAF sites 
(airfields, radar stations, etc.) to bombing London, Fighter Command would make a keen 
operational adjustment to take advantage of this new opportunity.  The geographic 
proximity of London played a key role in this adjustment for two reasons:  1) London 
was on the edge of the Me-109’s maximum range, and 2) knowing that London was the 
Luftwaffe’s target provided war planners and air controllers sufficient time to assemble 
large numbers of fighters (from Groups 10, 11, and 12) to meet the incoming air assault 
in sufficient strength to finally inflict heavy losses.  Having preserved a sufficient 
fighting force, RAF Fighter Command would now choose the right battlefield and 
conditions in which to employ this force, and that battlefield was the skies over London 
on September 15, 1940.  To meet the first wave of the Luftwaffe attack, the RAF put up 
                                                 
59 Frank Heilenday, The Battle of Britain -- Luftwaffe vs. RAF:  Lessons Learned and Lingering Myths 
from World War II (P-7915), 16-18. 
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17 squadrons (from Groups 11, 10, and 12; about 200 fighters) and held another 12 
squadrons in reserve.  By operationally maneuvering forces from other sectors to the 
south, the RAF was able to concentrate sufficient combat power at the right place and 
time for maximum effect.  During this wave, the large RAF formations forced the 
Luftwaffe formations to breakup, and then British pilots exacted a heavy toll on German 
fighters and bombers.  During the next wave, Fighter Command successfully rallied 26 
squadrons (from Groups 11 and 10; about 310 fighters) to meet the airborne invasion 
force.  Using superior situational awareness of the coming attack force, Fighter 
Command employed operational maneuver between the forces of Groups 10, 11, and 12 
to apply sufficient combat power at the right place and time to do the most damage to the 
Luftwaffe.60 
 
c. Operational Employment Summary 
By simultaneously coordinating air defense activities over southern 
England, relocating vulnerable RAF forces beyond the reach of Luftwaffe combat power, 
and augmenting Group 11 with Group 10 and 12 forces at the right place and time via 
operational maneuver, the RAF was able to continually delay the Luftwaffe’s ability to 
destroy the RAF.  As a result, the RAF was able to deny the Luftwaffe air superiority for 
an extended period of time (over four months) and thereby prevented Germany’s invasion 
of Great Britain.  It is also worth emphasizing the jointness of this operation that often 
goes unnoticed.  One the one hand, Royal Army and RAF forces operated jointly and 
effectively at the tactical level in the defense of Great Britain’s skies; however, Sir Hugh 
Dowding also clearly understood his joint role in supporting the Royal Navy by denying 
the Luftwaffe air superiority. 
 
                                                 
60 Len Deighton, Battle of Britain, 174-178 and Peter Townsend, Duel of Eagles, 401-410. 
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C. OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS 
The RAF was successful during the Battle of Britain because strong leaders like 
Sir Hugh Dowding were able to weave technology, operational command and control, 
and an operational doctrine for the employment of air power into a self-reinforcing 
system that resulted in the effective employment air power. 
 
1. Technological Readiness - Professionalizing the RAF Force 
Friendly weapons technology does not have to be the best but must be good 
enough to defeat the technology of one’s adversaries.  In addition, weapons technology is 
only as good as the tactics, training, skills, and experiences of the combat forces 
employing them.  At the beginning of the war, the RAF suffered greatly and 
unnecessarily by assuming away the need for a viable fighter force in favor of a 
predominantly bomber force.  Over the four months of the Battle of Britain, the RAF 
eventually adapted their tactics, updated their training, and improved their readiness to 
the point where RAF fighter pilots could more equitably meet their Luftwaffe 
counterparts in air battles over England.  The need to organize, train, and equip a 
professional and tactically viable force (to include air and ground crews) is vital to the 
tactical, operational, and strategic capabilities of the air force. 
 
2. Jointness, Centralized Control, and Decentralized Execution 
Every military force has finite resources to employ in combat, and in the art of 
warfare, these resources must be rallied and employed in the most effective manner to 
maximize unity of effort and reduce wasted resources and combat power.  During the 
Battle of Britain, the RAF effectively unified the efforts of the joint force (the Army and 
Air Force) towards the task of defending Britain against the Luftwaffe via centralized 
control at the operational level.  Moreover, at the strategic level, Sir Hugh Dowding’s 
keen insight and acceptance of air power’s supporting roll in the joint warfight (namely, 
the Royal Navy’s defense of the English Channel to preclude a German invasion force 
from landing) often goes unnoticed.  Joint unity of effort is critical to maximizing a 
military’s capability to defeat a determined and powerful enemy. 
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Centralized control of the air defenses of Britain also provided the RAF with the 
ability to develop holistic, operational-level situational awareness of the airborne 
battlefield over Britain.  With the speed and reach of combat aircraft, a fractured and 
ground-centric command and control structure would not have enabled any headquarters 
to acquire a viable common operating picture and then to adjust operations accordingly.  
In addition, centralized control enabled centralized planning to take advantage of 
operational-level opportunities when they presented themselves.  Since the RAF was not 
in a position to dictate the operations tempo, Fighter Command instead used this 
improved situational awareness and centralized control to slow down and draw out the 
operations tempo to the chagrin of the Luftwaffe battle staff.  Centralized control also 
enabled for the timely updating and dissemination of the common operating picture to all 
echelons of command and thereby enabled Sector Control centers to make better tactical 
decisions.  Combined with an effective yet primitive radar network, centralized control 
extended the battlefield awareness of the entire RAF from the Headquarters down to 
Group Control centers down to Sector Control centers down to the pilots, ground crews, 
observers, and AA gunners responsible for the decentralized tactical employment of 
combat power.  The speed, reach, and lethality of combat air power dictates that 
centralized control and decentralized execution is the most effective means of 
operationally employing defensive air power. 
 
3. Doctrine for Employing Air Power 
Many doctrinal principles can be derived from the RAF’s historical performance 
during the Battle of Britain.  First, fighting jointly was a doctrinal tenant employed during 
the Battle of Britain.  At the most basic level, the efforts of the Army’s Anti-Aircraft 
Command, the RAF Fighter Command, the RAF Bomber Command, and the Royal 
Observer Corps had to be unified to support each other in the defense of Britain.  A 
failure to do so would have resulted in the fragmented defense of Great Britain’s skies 
which would likely have allowed the Luftwaffe to gain air superiority. 
Second, survivability was another doctrinal tenant used in the defense of Britain.  
Anticipating potential or real attacks, the RAF prepared their forces to survive.  One must 
assume that in an attack, friendly forces will suffer battle damage and must therefore take 
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measures to mitigate these effects before, during, and after the attack.  Prior to the attack, 
the use of passive defensive measures such as cover, concealment, camouflage, dispersal, 
and hardening must be employed to reduce friendly vulnerabilities.  During the attacks, 
the defense force must respond quickly to fend off the attack in order to minimize battle 
damage and to inflict harm on the opponent.  After the attack, forces must have the 
capacity to quickly repair and reconstitute combat capabilities.  From the strategic 
perspective, the appropriate defense industrial base must be mobilized in order to sustain 
the military’s warfighting capabilities over time. 
Third, operational maneuver must be carefully employed in order to maximize 
friendly advantages and minimize friendly vulnerabilities.  Operational maneuver is a 
necessary part of the response in order to enhance the survivability of friendly forces 
while inflicting damage upon one’s opponents.  Operational maneuvers are not limited to 
merely attacking and defending, but also include moves to relocate, augment, withdraw, 
and delay.  The time and place for particular operational maneuvers is highly dependent 
upon the current situation.  Combined with the improved operational-level situational 
awareness afforded by the RAF Fighter Control System, Fighter Command was able to 
operationally defend, relocate, augment, and delay at the right places and times in order 
to prevent the destruction of the RAF, to buy the time they needed to reconstitute and 
strengthen their position, and then to concentrate their combat power under more 
favorable conditions to inflict harm upon and to repel the Luftwaffe invaders. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
In summary, the RAF successfully employed defensive air power during the 
Battle of Britain through the proper combination of operational level command and 
control, operational employment, and technology employment.  As a result, the RAF had 
superior situational awareness as compared to the Luftwaffe battle staff throughout the 
entire campaign.  Furthermore, this superior awareness enabled the Fighter Command to 
make more sound operational decisions to prevent the RAF from being destroyed, to slow 
and draw out the tempo of the campaign, and then to strike with concentrated power 
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IV. SIX DAYS WAR:  DISINTEGRATED AIR DEFENSES 
A. CONTEXT 
On 5 June 1967, Israel launched surprise preemptive air strikes against Egypt to 
initiate the Six Days War, also known as the June 1967 War.  On one side of the war sat 
Israel alone, and on the other side of the war sat the combined military forces of Egypt, 
Jordan, and Syria, respectively on the southern, eastern, and northern flanks of Israel.61  
Israel was effectively surrounded on all sides by adversaries and was significantly 
outnumbered in most aspects.  However, after six days of intense fighting, Israel rose as 
the decisive military victor, leading many historians to characterize this war as how 
“David conquered Goliath.”  The Israeli preemptive air strikes served as the spearhead of 
a surprise, combined arms offensive which enabled the smaller Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) to rapidly and successfully overwhelm the much larger combined Egyptian, Syrian, 
and Jordanian military forces to decisively seize control of the Sinai Peninsula, West 
Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and eastern Jerusalem in just six days.62  In the words of 
the militarily defeated King Hussein of Jordan: 
The battle was waged against us almost exclusively from the air with 
overwhelming strength and continual, sustained air attacks on every single 
unit of our armed forces, day and night.63 
Had the Egyptian, Syrian, and/or Jordanian air forces been able to successfully 
defend against the Israeli offensive air campaign to maintain air superiority (or at a 
minimum deny air superiority to the Israelis), the outcome of this war would likely have 
been different.  It is arguable whether the Arab states would have prevailed; however, it 
is reasonable to postulate that a more effective air defense campaign would have enabled 
Egypt and the Arab states to protect their respective ground forces and to inflict heavy 
losses on the IAF and IDF.  This chapter shall explore how a numerically and arguably 
                                                 
61 Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were the major Arab nations that participated in the Six Days War.  
Although Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon were involved, they were only minimally involved and did not 
contribute significantly enough to be considered in this analysis.  In particular, they did not contribute 
significantly to the air campaign. 
62 Hal Kosut, ed., Israel and the Arabs:  The June 1967 War, New York, NY:  Facts on File 
Publications, 1968, 66-67. 
63 King Hussein bin Talal as quoted in Kenneth Pollack, “Air Power in the Six-Day War,” 472. 
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more technologically capable Egyptian Air Force (EAF) had ineffectively employed air 
power, which quickly led to the decisive defeat of not only their air forces but of the 
entire Egyptian military.  The current literature on the Six Days War provides a wealth of 
information regarding how the Israeli Air Force (IAF) succeeded in their offensive air 
campaign; in contrast, this chapter shall not focus on the factors which contributed to the 
IAF’s success but rather shall focus on the factors that inevitably led to the EAF’s failure 
as a prelude to the failure of the entire Egyptian military.  In addition, the case of Egypt 
was singled out (vice Syria or Jordan) because it had the largest military and air force of 
these three states and presumably should have been the most capable at repelling the IAF.  
As such, the air war over Egypt in the Six Days War is the focus of this case study. 
 
1. Commander’s Intent 
With the recent air and ground clashes between Israeli and Syrian forces in April 
of 1967, the massing of troops on both sides of the Israeli borders, and Egypt instituting a 
naval blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba at the Strait of Tiran against Israel, the military 
forces of both sides of this conflict were poised for war on 4 June 1967.64  In this 
historical context, one can reasonably assume that the intent of the Commander of the 
EAF would be to maintain Egyptian air superiority in order to protect and defend 
Egyptian military forces (air and ground) from any threat posed by the IAF, as well as 
being prepared to conduct offensive air operations in support of any potential Egyptian 
ground offensive into Israeli territory.  Specifically, Egyptian air superiority would 
contribute towards a successful Egyptian military campaign against the IDF. 
 
2. Terrain 
In many ways, the geographic situation of Egypt prior to and during the Six Days 
War was comparable to if not better than that of the United Kingdom in the Battle of 
Britain (see Figure 10).  First, the preponderance of Egyptian urban centers and the 
capital city were relatively far from Israeli ground and air forces, providing a buffer of 
space and time.  In addition, the Egyptian mainland (west of the Suez Canal) was 
protected by the water barrier of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez.  Second, the terrain 
                                                 
64 Hal Kosut, 39-65. 
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of much of the Sinai Peninsula itself is hilly and gets more rugged towards the south, 
which would hinder the advancement of Israeli military ground forces.  Towards the 
northern coastal region of the Sinai, the terrain is flatter and more traversable.  Third, 
Egypt enjoyed the “home field advantage” and had entrenched a large military force to 
fend off any potential Israeli incursion.65  Fourth, Egypt enjoyed a measure of sea 
superiority over Israel in the Mediterranean Sea, Gulf of Suez, and Gulf of Abaqa (where 
Egypt had initiated the blockade), because Israel’s Navy was antiquated.66  Thus Egypt 
enjoyed greater freedom of maneuver in the Mediterranean Sea; at worst, the 
Mediterranean would be neutral territory.  Fifth, Egypt was not surrounded by enemies, 
whereas Israel was.  With Saudi Arabia and Jordan covering the southeastern flank of the 
Sinai, Egypt only had to worry about an Israeli incursion from one direction; whereas, 
Israel was being threatened along all its land borders.67 
 
 
Figure 10.   Satellite Image - Sinai Peninsula Terrain (After 68) 
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66 “The Israeli Navy Throughout Israel’s Wars,” Jewish Virtual Library, 
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67 Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War:  Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, 59. 
68 Underlying satellite image of the Sinai Peninsula provided by Google Maps, 
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25996,33.97522&spn=4.048669,6.954346&t=h&z=8&om=1, last accessed Oct 25, 2007. 
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3. Enemy Forces (IAF) and Friendly Forces (EAF) 
On paper, the combined Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian forces had Israeli forces 
outnumbered and outgunned in troops, tanks, and aircraft by a factor of roughly 2-to-1 
(see Table 7, Appendix F).  In addition, Egypt alone had a nearly 2-to-1 numerical 
advantage in combat aircraft (especially in fighters) with the EAF bringing approximately 
450 combat aircraft to bear against the IAF’s 257 combat aircraft (see Table 8, Appendix 
G).  Also, although Egypt could afford to commit most of its air assets to the defense of 
the Sinai, Israel had to be mindful of the Syrian and Jordanian air forces arrayed to the 
north and east and thus had to be prepared to use its limited air resources against an 
additional 127 combat aircraft coming from the opposite direction.  Thus the effective 
combat power of the EAF should have been more than sufficient to maintain Egyptian air 
superiority over the Sinai Peninsula.  Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Israeli air forces 
were arrayed and positioned as illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Situation Map:  Eve of the Six Days War (From 69) 
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457035/html/default.stm, last accessed Oct 25, 2007. 
 51 
B. DEFENDING EGYPTIAN SKIES 
In analyzing the EAF’s defense of Egyptian skies, the same factors of command 
and control, operational employment, and technology employment that were evaluated in 
Chapter III as they pertained to the United Kingdom’s success in the Battle of Britain 
shall be evaluated as they pertain to the EAF’s failure.  Conclusions shall be drawn by 
comparing and contrasting EAF versus RAF performance under comparable conditions. 
 
1. Technology Employment 
By 1967, the EAF was a very modern and well-equipped air force and perhaps the 
most capable air force among all the Arab nations.  Egypt had purchased modern radar 
systems, jet aircraft, armaments, and training from the Soviet Union and had been 
indoctrinated with corresponding Soviet military doctrine to employ them.70  Combined 
with the fact that the EAF enjoyed a significant numerical advantage in raw numbers and 
in numbers of more advanced weapons and was entrenched on the Sinai, the Egyptian 
technological edge should have translated into an Egyptian victory.  A more detailed 
analysis is required to reveal the factors that contributed to the EAF’s defeat. 
 
a. Aircraft 
In 1967, Egypt’s most advanced fighter was the Soviet-built MiG-21; 
Israel’s was the French-built Mirage III (see Figure 12).71  In comparison to the IAF, 
EAF technology was arguably more advanced, although the IAF’s French-built aircraft 
technology was still very capable.  Both aircraft were comparably armed with 30 mm 
cannons and heat-seeking missiles (the AA-2 Atoll and R.550 Magic respectively), and 
both aircraft were equipped with airborne radar and a Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) to 
detect when they were being tracked by ground-based or aircraft-based radar systems. 
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http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_262.shtml, last accessed Oct 15, 2007. 
71 “Arab Air Forces on 5 June 1967” and “5 June 1967 Israeli Air Strikes,” War and Game, 




Figure 12.   EAF MiG-21 and IAF Mirage-III (From 72) 
                                                            (top)                   (bottom) 
 
Regarding performance, the MiG-21 held a slight edge since it had more power, a higher 
maximum speed (1385 mph versus the Mirage’s 863 mph), and longer range (721 miles 
versus the Mirage’s 425 miles).73  In addition, the IAF only had 72 Mirage-IIIs to the 
EAF’s 130 MiG-21s; moreover, the remainder of the IAF inventory included much older 
systems and technology.  In the opinion of the Soviets, Egyptians, and Israelis, the EAF 
had more than sufficient numbers of Soviet-built fighters to match and/or exceed in 
quality, capability, and quantity every fighter that the IAF had in its inventory.74  While 
both air forces owned fighter-bombers, Egypt also owned and operated the Il-28 light 
bomber and the Tu-16 supersonic medium bomber.  From a technical capabilities 
perspective, the EAF should have been able to go head-to-head with the IAF. 
 
b. Ground Based Air Defenses 
Egyptian ground-based air defenses consisted predominantly of Soviet-
built Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) systems and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems 
tied to target acquisition, fire control, and target tracking radar systems.  These systems 
were linked into a Soviet-style centralized air defense system to provide operational-level 
situational awareness of the air defense situation over Egypt.75  The foundation of the 
                                                 
72 “Arab Air Forces on 5 June 1967.” 
73 “MiG-21 Specifications” and “Mirage III Specification” from FAS Military Network, 
http://www.fas.org and Combat Aircraft.com, http://www.combataircraft.com, last accessed Oct 15, 2007. 
74 Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War:  Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, 59-60. 
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Egyptian ground-based air defense system was the Soviet-built SA-2 (see left image, 
Figure 13).  The SA-2 system had proven to be a very capable air defense system, for this 
was the same system that had been used to shoot down U.S. Air Force pilot Francis Gary 
Powers in a U-2 over the Soviet Union in 1960.  On the other side, Israeli ground-based 
air defense systems were comprised of predominantly French-built AAA systems and the 
recently acquired U.S.-built HAWK SAM system (see right image, Figure 13) which had 
been recently added to their weapons inventory in 1965.76  Both systems were very 
capable and lethal, but the SA-2 had greater missile speed (Mach 4 versus the HAWK’s 
Mach 2), greater range (40 km versus the HAWK’s 24km), and a higher maximum 
altitude (85,000 feet versus the HAWK’s 60,000 feet).77  Another difference was that the 
SA-2 was command guided (e.g. remote controlled by its operator) to the target while the 
HAWK used semi-active radar homing (e.g. ground-based target tracking radar would 
illuminate the target with radar and the missile would follow the reflected energy back to 
said target).  From a pure technological capabilities perspective, Egyptian ground-based 
air defense systems should have been capable of inflicting heavy losses against the IAF. 
 
    
Figure 13.   Egyptian SA-2 and Israeli HAWK Surface-to-Air Missiles (From 78) 
                                         (left)                      (right) 
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c. Military Readiness 
The EAF was well-equipped with numerous state-of-the-art weapon 
systems against an arguably inferior IAF, and they significantly outnumbered the IAF.  
Second, Egypt was operating on its home turf, while Israel would have the burden of 
seizing territory.  Given that these factors were stacked in favor of the EAF and yet they 
were defeated, one more factor must be assessed in order to explain why the EAF 
suffered so greatly at the hands of the IAF.  This last factor is military readiness. 
In the simplest terms, technological capability is limited to the skills of the 
personnel that employ it.  Simply having better weapons does not equate to battlefield 
success unless one’s personnel are properly trained to employ them; only then can the 
technical edge of one’s systems be translated into a competitive battlefield advantage.  In 
this regard, the EAF failed miserably to provide the necessary skills to its forces charged 
with defending Egyptian skies.  For example, the EAF as a whole had only a 70 percent 
operational readiness rate, and the readiness of the EAF’s premier MiG-21 squadrons was 
only 60-65 percent.79  As such, Egyptian fighter pilots were no match for their IAF 
counterparts.  On the first day of the war, 20 percent of the EAF force was not 
operational because of the combination of 1) the poor proficiency of ground crews to 
generate sorties (e.g. repair and prepare aircraft for combat) and 2) the poor skills of 
pilots to fight in the air.  Poor readiness was such a problem that the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency had accurately assessed that the IAF was capable of attaining air 
supremacy over the Sinai in less than 24 hours if they initiated the offensive or within 
two to three days if Egypt attacked first.80  Egyptian ground-based air defense forces 
faired a little better and thus accounted for the preponderance of downed IAF aircraft, 
mainly by AAA fire;81 however, the overall lack of professionalism and readiness turned 
the IAF’s success on the battlefield into the EAF’s slaughter. 
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2. Command and Control 
Between 1956 and 1967, Egyptian national and military decision makers had 
reorganized the EAF in alliance with Soviet ground-centric military doctrine.  At the top 
of the EAF organizational structure sat the General Headquarters (GHQ), under which sat 
the Supreme Command Council (SCC).  Below the SCC, air forces were organized into 
Air Brigades of three Squadrons each of which were tied into a centralized air defense 
system controlled by the SCC.  Despite most Air Brigades being organized under the 
centralized control of the SCC, several Air Brigades were also put under the direct 
control of the Army under the respective ground commander’s local control centers.  In 
fact, several Squadrons that were supposed to be under the control of the SCC via their 
respective Air Brigade were also chopped to localized Army control.  Local control 
centers were integrated into a Soviet-style command and control system and were 
supported by 12 radar stations and ground observers.  Figure 14 provides an illustration 
of the operational C2 structure of the EAF during the Six Days War.  In addition, the 
command-and-control of the aforementioned ground-based air defense forces (AAA and 
SA-2 SAMs) was comparably dispersed amongst commanders in the field according to 
geography.82  Several conclusions can be drawn about this convoluted EAF C2 structure. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Operational C2 of the EAF 
 
                                                 
82 “Arab Air Forces on 5 June 1967.” 
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a. Fragmented Unity of Effort 
First, two separate entities were responsible for the air defense of Egypt:  
the EAF and the ground-based air defenses (some under Army and others under EAF 
control).  However, these two lines of effort were never unified.  Referring to Figure 14, 
no one had been clearly designated as responsible for the air defense of Egypt.  This 
factor became most evident when Egypt had to shut down its own air defense systems on 
the first day of the war for fear that Egyptian AAA and/or SA-2s might inadvertently 
shoot down the air transport carrying Field Marshall Abdel Hakim ‘Amr (Commander of 
the Egyptian Armed Forces) and Lt Gen Mahmud Sidqi Mahmud (Commander of the 
EAF) on board.83  The result was that no one was designated overall in charge of the air 
defense of Egypt, and no one took the initiative to take charge.  If an entity was actually 
in charge of the unified air defense of Egypt, one would expect to find evidence of this 
central air defense authority in the form of a unified air defense plan or orders to 
coordinate the actions of EAF field units and/or ground-based air defense units; however, 
no such plans or orders can be found in the historical record.  This disunity of effort was 
not only internal, but was also external.  After Egypt had coaxed Syria and Jordan to join 
the war, no one unified the efforts of the collective Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air 
forces and air defenses.  As a result, the air defense of Egypt was fractured both internally 
between the EAF and ground-based air defenses, between EAF units themselves, and 
across the combined air forces of the EAF, Syrian Air Force, and Jordanian Air Force. 
 
b. No Control and Centralized Execution 
Second, the EAF command enforced highly centralized control and 
centralized execution, having concentrated all authority at the top and delegating none to 
lower level commanders.  As a result, the EAF as a whole was very slow to respond on 
the battlefield because field commanders would wait for their orders before taking any 
action.  The net result was that EAF officers at all levels literally froze until they received 
orders from their higher headquarters.  This would include Egyptian air bases that refused 
to launch aircraft that had survived the initial IAF attack wave without orders to do so 
                                                 
83 Jeremy Bowen, Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East, New York, NY:  Thomas 
Dunne Books, 2005,  114-115 and Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War:  Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, 63. 
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from above.  As a result, many of these aircraft were destroyed on the ground in 
successive IAF attack waves.  This effect was further exacerbated when Lt Gen Mahmud 
Sidqi Mahmud (Commander of the EAF) found himself stuck on an air transport in the 
air in search of an undamaged airfield on which to land.  Since he was effectively out of 
the fight and all EAF operational and tactical authorities were held in him, the head of the 
EAF war machine had effectively been chopped off paralyzing the entire EAF.  In 
addition, this centralized control and centralized execution further hindered cooperation 
between the EAF and the Egyptian Army and Navy, resulting in poor joint support and 
performance.84  Throughout the entire war, centralized control and centralized execution 
effectively and efficiently paralyzed the EAF at all command levels and prevented them 
from organizing their 140 remaining fighters to defend Egyptian airspace. 
 
c. No Situational Awareness 
Operational level situational awareness of the air defense of Egypt was 
severely hindered due to the matrixed chain of command.  At no point in this 
organizational structure does the complete air picture over Egypt ever accumulate to 
provide any commander sufficient awareness of what was happening on the battlefield 
over the Sinai or mainland Egypt.  Though the centralized air defense system attached to 
the SCC was supposed to provide centralized control of all air defenses, there is no 
historical evidence that SCC personnel were aware of what was really happening or that 
reports from the field were being channeled to the SCC to provide accurate updates.  This 
factor would be further exacerbated by lies told by military officers at all levels in an 
attempt to cover up how much damage had been done to the EAF on the first day of the 
strikes, to include lies told by Field Marshall ‘Amr to President Nasser to cover up the 
fact that a large portion of the EAF had been destroyed.  There is also evidence in the 
form of contradictory reporting from all levels of the Egyptian chain of command that no 
one in the EAF knew what was happening.85  The fractured organizational structure 
contributed to piecemeal situational awareness which crippled the EAF. 
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d. C2 Summary 
The end result of the EAF’s fractured organizational structure, centralized 
control and centralized execution, and fractured situational awareness turned what should 
have been the modern integrated air defenses of Egypt into disintegrated air defenses, 
which the IAF exploited and destroyed.  There was no unity of effort exhibited by the 
EAF during the entire Egyptian air defense campaign.  These factors combined with the 
poor readiness of EAF forces with disastrous and lethal results. 
 
3. Operational Employment 
EAF forces and aircraft were positioned at 25 main bases supported by ground-
based air defense systems.86  Besides the aforementioned problems with technology 
employment and command and control, the EAF further exacerbated their failed 
performance with the poor operational employment of their air defenses, both air and 
ground-based.  In this venue, the EAF failed on two fronts:  1) they failed to adequately 
prepare for attack, and 2) they failed to effectively regroup and respond to the attack. 
 
a. Survivability 
On 4 June 1967, the EAF was completely unprepared for war against the 
IAF.  Regardless of the contradictory reports coming from Egyptian intelligence as to 
whether Israel would attack, the Egyptian military and EAF leadership should have 
anticipated that war with Israel was possible and made the necessary preparations for 
such an event.  The only two options in the event of war would be either Egypt would 
attack first or Israel would attack first.  Since President Nasser did not anticipate that 
Egypt would launch an attack,87 Egyptian military leaders should have anticipated that in 
the event of war, Israel would likely initiate aggression.  As such, they should have been 
prepared for just such as event; however, they were not, as was evident by their many 
inactions.  Blind to their own vulnerabilities, the EAF was effectively postured for 
destruction by the IAF.  First, the entire EAF was not prepared to be struck.  Specifically, 
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EAF aircraft were lined up neatly in rows on their respective airfields, which made IAF 
targeting and destruction all the more easy.88  No efforts to conceal, harden, or disperse 
valuable EAF air assets were conducted at any of the 25 bases, and camouflage efforts 
with the placement of dummy aircraft had limited effectiveness.89  This was akin to the 
situation the U.S. Navy faced when it lined up all of its warships to make them easier for 
the military police to guard just prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  In addition, 
the EAF was not on alert on 5 June 1967, although they had been on alert just two days 
prior.  Lastly, EAF military leaders did not know what an IAF attack might look like and 
did not bother to ask said question.  As such, EAF war planners did not recognize that air 
bases in the Sinai Peninsula and those located in proximity to Egyptian urban centers 
along the Nile were well within striking range of IAF aircraft.  Simple math reveals that 
IAF aircraft could strike targets in mainland Egypt in less than 1 hour.  Yet EAF forces 
were not postured accordingly, as was evident when most of their aircraft were destroyed 
on the ground after returning from their morning patrols while many EAF officers were 
still on their way to work.  Finally, EAF field commanders had no standing orders, 
authorities, or procedures as to what they should do in the event of an attack.  These 
failures in operational leadership combined with poor military readiness and a 
micromanaged yet fractured command and control structure inevitably contributed to the 
destruction of 18 Egyptian air bases and the loss of some 300 EAF aircraft and 100 
pilots.90 
 
b. Operational Maneuver 
Even though the first day of IAF attacks dealt a devastating blow to the 
EAF, the EAF still had approximately 140 fighters that could have been mustered to 
defend the skies over Egypt; yet this operational level response never occurred.  In 
addition, the Syrian and Jordanian air forces could have brought another 121 fighters to 
bear.  Yet, the EAF as a whole failed to regroup and then to organize a coordinated 
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response to IAF aggression.  Despite 18 air bases being struck, dedicated runway repair 
crews were able to repair most runways quickly.91  With over 250 fighters still available 
between the EAF, Syrian Air Force, and Jordanian Air Force to meet the IAF, the EAF 
failed to coordinate a unified response that could have massed sufficient resources and 
maneuvered them into a more effective defense against the IAF.  The EAF lacked a 
theory of air power doctrine, and thus no plan was ever developed and little to no 
coordination was done to maneuver or concentrate the remaining air force assets for 
maximum effectiveness.92  No effort was made to unify the effects of ground-based and 
air defenses.  Coordination with the Syrian and Jordanian Air Forces was minimal at best.  
The net result was a very static and fragmented air defense campaign.  The remaining 
EAF pilots and aircraft bravely took to the skies to do battle with the IAF in poorly 
coordinated and dispersed waves, only to return with fewer aircraft.93 
 
c. Operational Employment Summary 
The EAF’s piecemeal application of air power enabled the IAF to 
concentrate its forces against adversaries in a sequential fashion so as to never be 
outnumbered while the Arab air forces had effectively divided themselves to be 
conquered.  A coordinated EAF air campaign could have created sufficient space and 
time for Egyptian ground forces on the Sinai Peninsula to safely retreat without being 
massacred, and at best, such a coordinated effort might have inflicted heavier Israeli 
losses and drawn out the length of this campaign to change the outcome of the entire war. 
 
C. OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS 
The EAF clearly failed during the Six Days War because Egyptian military 
leaders had not properly integrated technology, operational command and control, and an 
operational doctrine into effective combat air power. 
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1. Failure of Technological Readiness - The Unprofessional EAF 
Although EAF weapons technology was superior in quality and numbers to that of 
the IAF, the EAF failed to integrate the most important component of these weapon 
systems--people.  Weapons technology is only as good as the tactics, training, skills, and 
experiences invested in the combat forces employing them.  At the outset of the war, the 
EAF suffered tremendously by failing to train enough fighter pilots to fight against their 
IAF adversary.  This mission readiness was also reflected in poor ground crew readiness 
and the poor aircraft serviceability and turnaround rate that resulted.  Over six days, EAF 
pilots climbed into the air only to be shot down by the lethal tactical prowess of their IAF 
counterparts.  Unfortunately, the Egyptians did not have four months to regroup and 
retrain their pilots like the RAF did during the Battle of Britain.  The need to organize, 
train, and equip a professional and tactically viable force (to include air and ground 
crews) is vital to the tactical, operational, and strategic capabilities of the air force. 
 
2. Fragmented C2 Equals Operational Paralysis 
The EAF also failed to unify the efforts of the joint force or even their own air 
forces to defend Egyptian skies.  On paper, the Soviet-style centralized air defense 
system was supposed to integrate air based (e.g. fighters) and ground based air defenses 
(e.g. AAA and SAMs); however in implementation, some EAF squadrons fell under the 
operational control of the Army while the majority of the EAF forces remained under 
SCC control.  Also, ground-based air defense forces were under the operational control of 
Army commanders.  The operational command and control structure was dictated by the 
varying service cultures and demographics instead of being dictated by the mission at 
hand, which was to defend Egyptian aerial territory.  Therefore, no one entity was in 
operational control of or responsible for all Egyptian air defenses. 
Due to the highly centralized command structure and culture of the EAF and the 
Egyptian military in general, most EAF units refused to launch their fighters without 
explicit orders.  Since no one was operationally in charge of all Egyptian air defenses, no 
operational level plan was developed for the air defense of Egypt and related tasks and 
orders could not be disseminated to EAF units.  All EAF units could do was to launch 
responsively in ineffective attempts to fend off the IAF intruders.  This failure to unify 
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the joint air defenses of Egypt, to centrally control and centrally plan for said air defense 
campaign, and to decentralize tactical execution culminated in operational level paralysis 
of all Egyptian air defenses.  Finally, the most telling evidence supporting this effect is 
that the IAF did not specifically target major EAF command and control nodes; instead, 
they targeted EAF fighter and bomber forces on the ground.  Yet the EAF was still 
operationally paralyzed. 
 
3. No Doctrine for Employing Air Power 
Although the EAF failed to defend Egypt during the Six Days War, many 
doctrinal principles can still be derived from their failed performance.  First, the EAF 
failed to fight jointly and thus failed to unify the efforts of their AAA and SAM forces in 
the Army and of their own EAF forces.  The result was a clearly fragmented response in 
the face of skilled and lethal IAF aggression.  The IAF took clear advantage of this seam 
to quickly and decisively seize air superiority over Egypt. 
Second, the EAF never properly considered survivability.  The EAF had not 
anticipating potential or real attacks from the IAF and therefore failed to prepare their 
forces to survive a surprise attack.  One must reasonably assume that during an attack, 
friendly forces will suffer battle damage, and military leaders must therefore take 
measures to mitigate these effects before, during, and after attacks.  Instead, the EAF 
parked their aircraft in neat rows which made the IAF surprise attack all the more 
destructive.  Prior to the attack, passive defensive measures such as cover, concealment, 
camouflage, dispersal, and hardening were not employed to reduce friendly 
vulnerabilities.  Feeble attempts at unrealistic deception were the only indication of any 
anticipatory EAF preparations.  During the attacks, defense forces could not respond 
quickly enough to fend off attackers.  After the attacks, the EAF did not have sufficient 
capacity to quickly repair and reconstitute their combat capabilities.  The IAF fully 
exploited the EAF’s failure to plan for survivability with devastating results. 
Third, the EAF failed to employ any operational maneuver in their impotent 
attempt to drive back the IAF.  The remaining EAF forces were launched in a haphazard 
fashion which did not take into consideration minimizing friendly vulnerabilities and 
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maximizing opportunities.  The Egyptian defensive posture remained very static, which 
made the mission of the IAF much easier.  Fighters were not on alert in the event of an 
IAF attack.  Precious fighter resources were never sufficiently concentrated at the right 
places and times to have any effect.  For example, Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air 
efforts were not coordinated and integrated, which thereby allowed the smaller IAF to 
take on and defeat each enemy in turn instead of facing a multi-front threat.  As another 
example, a continuous wave of moderately sized air formations employing hit and run 
tactics could have be used to constantly harass the IAF throughout the campaign.  
Although the EAF was not tactically proficient enough to challenge IAF pilots in a fair 
fight, these harassing hit and run tactics may have challenged Israeli air superiority 
enough to buy time and space for the Egyptian ground forces to retreat without being 
massacred.  The EAF did not husband their remaining IAF combat forces for a sustained 
and drawn out conflict and did not make the operational level adjustments necessary to 
challenge Israeli air superiority. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
In summary, the EAF failed miserably to employ defensive air power during the 
Six Days War.  Their failure to properly combine operational level command and control, 
air power doctrine, and technology gave the IAF a decisive advantage over the EAF.  The 
inevitable results were the loss of Egyptian air superiority followed by the routing of 
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V. INTEGRATED CYBER DEFENSES: 
PREPARING FOR THE FIRST REAL CYBERWAR 
A. BUILDING AN INTEGRATED CYBER DEFENSE 
Many nation-states have recognized the untapped strategic and operational 
opportunities and vulnerabilities associated with cyber warfare and have thus invested 
significant resources towards the development of their respective cyber warfare 
capabilities.94  In response to this emerging threat to U.S. national security, the DoD must 
not only develop offensive cyber warfare capabilities but must also develop the 
respective defensive cyber warfare capabilities in anticipation that U.S. adversaries will 
likely employ cyberweapons against U.S. military forces.  Although defensive 
capabilities cannot win a war, a failure to develop viable defenses can lose a war.  By 
combining the observations from Chapters II, III, and IV, this chapter shall recommend 
that the DoD invest resources towards the development of integrated cyber defense 
capabilities analogous to historically successful integrated air defenses.  These 
recommendations shall contribute to filling the current doctrinal gap regarding Computer 
Network Defense and will include recommendations regarding technology employment, 
operational employment, and operational command and control. 
On a clarifying note, integrated cyber defenses are not to be confused with an 
Integrated Cyber Defense System, just as integrated air defenses are not to be confused 
with an Integrated Air Defense System.  Integrated air defenses and integrated cyber 
defenses are holistic capabilities; whereas, Integrated Air Defense Systems and Integrated 
Cyber Defense Systems are systems designed to provide these capabilities.  From 
Chapter III, one can surmise that the RAF had successfully developed and employed 
integrated air defense capabilities during the Battle of Britain.  In contrast in Chapter IV, 
it is clear that although Egypt had purchased an Integrated Air Defense System from the 
Soviet Union, they did not develop or employ effective integrated air defense capabilities 
during the Six Days War. 
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B. THOUGHT EXPERIMENT - THE FIRST REAL CYBERWAR 
Italian airpower theorist Giulio Douhet wisely stated that “Victory smiles upon 
those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to 
adapt themselves after the changes occur.”  In keeping with this theme, this chapter shall 
use a thought experiment about what the first real cyberwar might look like to help 
illustrate the integrated cyber defense capabilities that the DoD needs to develop.  This 
thought experiment shall make several reasonable assumptions regarding the nature of 
this war based upon analogous lessons drawn from the case studies in Chapters III and 
IV.  The opposing forces for this thought experiment shall be the United States and a peer 
competitor state with comparable warfighting capabilities in the air, land, sea, space, and 
cyberspace domains.  To better illustrate the defensive capabilities required, the peer 
competitor state shall initiate aggression in this conflict, just as Britain’s and Egypt’s 
respective adversaries had done in the two cases studied.  We shall also assume that this 
adversary shall employ their air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace forces in a coordinated, 
combined arms fashion to maximize their asymmetric battlefield advantages and to 
exploit U.S. military vulnerabilities.  As such, the DoD would have to mount an effective 
defense across all warfighting domains in the face of this aggression.  More specifically, 
this chapter shall explore the DoD integrated cyber defense capabilities needed in order 
to defend DoD cyberspace.  Since this war will occur some time in the future, assume 
that both opponents possess more powerful cyber weapons than are in existence today 
(beyond mere web defacements, denial of service, information thefts, etc.).  Thus, the 
ability of U.S. military forces to fight would depend in large measure upon its ability to 
defend the computers and networks upon which the DoD has become so dependent. 
 
1. Technology Employment 
Prior to this cyberwar, the DoD needs to invest in several technologies to provide 
the foundational tactical capabilities needed to defend friendly cyberspace.  Using the 
RAF’s effective example of technology employment as a model, the DoD should develop 
a Cyber Sensor Net (comparable to the RAF Radar Network), Cyber Identify-Friend-or-
Foe (Cyber IFF; comparable to aircraft IFF), and defensive weapons (comparable to 
AAA, SAMs, or fighter interceptors). 
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a. Cyber Sensor Network 
Just as the RAF Radar Network had pushed the RAF’s situational 
awareness about Luftwaffe intruders beyond 100 miles beyond their borders, a 
comparable Cyber Sensor Net should be built to push DoD cyber situational awareness 
beyond U.S. borders.  Leveraging the attributes of the domain of cyberspace (see Chapter 
II), it seems reasonable to assume that such a system is technically feasible.  This is in 
contrast with current industry computer and network security methods that focus heavily 
upon the fielding of internal sensors such as intrusion detection systems, firewalls, anti-
virus scanners and so forth that detect attacks after they’ve hit or passed friendly network 
perimeters.  This Cyber Sensor Network must be pushed outwards to provide the DoD 
with the situational awareness needed to see an inbound attack in progress instead of 
waiting for the attack.  The deployment of this sensor network should include posting 
sensors outside DoD networks through partnerships with the private sector, allied 
governments, and or covert operations.  One can reasonably assume that a determined 
peer competitor is already developing this type of sensor capability.  Furthermore, the 
further out this Cyber Sensor Network can see, the better, since cyber attacks can occur at 
the speed of light.  Due to this speed, this Cyber Sensor Net may provide the first 
indications of not only the inbound cyber assault but also of the corresponding and 
pending attacks in the other four warfighting domains.  Finally, existing internal sensors 
must also be integrated to provide a common operating picture of the cyberspace 
battlefield to include friendly and enemy territory. 
 
b. Cyber Identify-Friend-or-Foe (Cyber IFF) 
Current network security systems focus on trying to sort out adversarial 
cyber activities from the vast amounts of data being stored, processed, and exchanged, 
and cyber attackers use this to their advantage by purposefully hiding in the vastness of 
cyberspace.  Technology also needs to provide a means by which to clearly identify 
friendly forces as well as adversaries in cyberspace.  In this venue, current initiatives such 
as the enterprise-wide deployment of Public Key Infrastructure fulfills part of this 
requirement.  However, cyberspace also includes friendly systems and software that 
could be clearly flagged and identified to limit the scope of the search for cyber intruders.  
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A variety of technologies already exists today (application checksums, digital signatures, 
Microsoft Group Policies, and so forth) but have not been integrated into a holistic cyber 
IFF system.  Today, various intrusion or malicious logic scanners must typically scan 
every file on every system or every packet.  In large measure, cyber defenders today do 
not have a comprehensive method by which to identify “bandits” (adversaries) versus 
friendlies versus “bogies” (unidentified).  Thus, almost all DoD cyberspace falls into the 
“bogie” category, making the identification of bandits more problematic and the potential 
for “cyber fratricide” greater.  A Cyber IFF capability could reduce this searching to 
better concentrate limited resources towards the task of finding adversaries. 
 
c. Defensive Cyber Weapons 
As mentioned in Chapter II, no open source defensive digital weapons 
currently exist that can shoot down inbound intruders.  The only options currently 
available to fend off a cyber attack are to attack the target at its source, to harden existing 
cyber fortification (block ports on firewalls, update anti-virus software with new 
signatures, etc.), or to withdraw (shutdown and/or disconnect the system or network).  
Defensive cyber weapons could be analogous to AAA or SAMs that are deployed around 
vital targets, or they could include interceptors that could “fly out” to shoot down the 
inbound aggressor.  For example, existing virus or spam techniques could be used to 
quickly package and push out a “good” virus that can spread and self guide across the 
Internet to destroy malicious code.  Such a weapon could be quickly developed and 
launched in response to an adversaries cyber weapons to counter and mitigate the 
destructive or disruptive effects.  Another example would be to build the capability to 
“laser designate” adversary cyber weapons at their source to enable these defensive cyber 
weapons to target them on their inbound track.  These weapons do pose legal and 
potential collateral damage challenges; however, these issues are not unlike those facing 
similar weapons in the other warfighting domains.  Finally, these defensive cyber 




d. Professionalizing the Force 
Last but not least, future cyber forces must be properly trained and ready 
to fight during this future cyber war.  This training becomes all the more challenging due 
to the high rate of technological advances and because industry is designed to build 
computer and network security experts vice cyber warfighters.  Cyber warfighters must 
be experts in not only the technological aspects of computer and network security but 
must also be adept at military doctrine and tactics; they must be warfighters first and 
technicians second.  As such, the DoD should stand up its own cyber warfare schools to 
grow this force.  Robust cyber exercises should be integrated with all conventional 
exercises to ensure sufficient cyber forces are properly prepared to defend against a 
determined and capable adversary in this future cyberwar scenario.  Advanced cyber 
weapons schools should also be stood up to develop cyber “Aces” who can return to the 
force and share their advanced cyber warfare techniques with their units.  On a final note, 
the current trends of information technology outsourcing and core services centralization 
pose a threat to the ability of the DoD to maintain a viable and ready cyber force.  Both 
options provide a more cost effective method of providing computer and network security 
services; however, both erode the professional cyber force that needs to be built to defend 
DoD and U.S. cyberspace. 
 
2. Operational Command and Control 
During the first cyberwar, it is reasonable to assume that any adversary would 
exploit seams and vulnerabilities to create competitive advantages on the battlefield.  The 
implication is that a failure to have unity of effort on cyber defense among the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps (or within each service) will translate into exploitable 
seams that will reduce the defensibility of friendly cyberspace.  Therefore, integrated 
cyber defenses must be joint by definition in order to be effective. 
Second, the best operational C2 structure for an effective integrated defense 
across joint forces is centralized control and decentralized execution.  In this area, serious 
deficiencies exist across and within the services and between Combatant Commands 
(COCOM).  For example, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has been formally 
assigned the mission of defending the DoD’ Global Information Grid and therefore 
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should have operational control (OPCON) of all cyber defense forces; however, 
geographic Combatant Commanders have been unwilling to yield OPCON to 
STRATCOM.  Moreover, each geographic COCOM conducts CND differently, thereby 
creating seams in the defenses which adversary cyber forces can and will readily exploit.  
To further confuse the issue, each service conducts CND differently and has differing 
internal C2 structures.  This effect creates multiple seams throughout DoD’s cyber 
defenses.  An example of this fractured operational C2 structure is illustrated in  
Figure 15.  From the perspective of the communications squadron at Osan Air Base (AB), 
CND orders are tasked from multiple sources at multiple echelons, and it is not 
uncommon for these orders to be inconsistent or conflicting.  Other AF installations in 
the Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR have a similarly convoluted operational C2 
structure; in addition, Navy/Marine Corps and Army installations in the same AOR have 
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PACOM Pacific Command (COCOM)
USFK U.S. Forces Korea (Sub-unified Command)
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Due to the inherent nature of networks to cross organizational boundaries, there 
are no easy solutions to simplifying this convoluted operational C2 structure.  Since the 
Area of Responsibility (AOR) for defensive cyberspace operations is global (see Chapter 
II, section E.1.), cyber defense forces should be operationally organized to take this 
warfighting domain feature into account.  Therefore, JTF-GNO should serve as the Area 
Cyber Defense Commander for global cyber defense operations in order to ensure joint 
and global unity of effort.  Each service component should then present their respective 
service cyber defense forces in a unified C2 structure spanning the same global AOR.  
The next C2 echelon within each service should align their cyber forces along existing 
COCOM geographic boundaries.  This echelon will report OPCON to the service 
component to maintain global unity of effort and would also serve as the theater cyber 
defense service component to the COCOM in a supporting relationship to their respective 
Theater Network Control Center (TNCC).  Service cyber defense units at each base 
would fill the last C2 echelon; more importantly, any tenant units would report to the 
base cyber defense unit.  For bases that host multiple services, the service that provides 
base operating support would provide the base’s cyber defense C2, and all tenant units 
(regardless of service) would report to the base cyber defense unit.  This operational C2 
structure clarifies cyber defense responsibilities and supported/supporting command 
relationships.  It also provides a hierarchical structure to enable coordinated operational-
level planning and execution of DoD cyber defenses.  This proposed operational C2 























































Figure 16.   Proposed CND Operational C2 
 
3. Operational Employment Concept 
Along with technology and an organizational framework, a holistic operational 
concept and related military doctrine are required to translate tactical capabilities into 
operational-level leverage.  Since the warfighting domain of cyberspace is not 
fundamentally different across services (see Chapter II, section E.6.), cyber defense 
doctrine should be joint to ensure unity of effort across all service.  Using the RAF’s 
successful employment of defensive air power and the EAF’s failed employment of the 
same as a model, defensive doctrine can be broken down into three broad doctrinal 
functions:  1) to posture, 2) to maneuver, and 3) to recover.  The model in Figure 17 
provides an illustration.  These functions can be applied to CND doctrine as well.  The 
focus framework is primarily intended to apply to the operational level of war; however, 
this framework can also applicable at lower command echelons to provide tactical 
commanders a valuable tool to improve the defensibility and survivability of their 




sequentially; rather, each defense function should support the other two functions.  Thus, 
the overall strength of one’s defenses can be characterized by the balance and supporting 





Figure 17.   CND Doctrinal Functions 
 
a. Posture 
Posturing encompasses proactive and reactive actions that increase the 
survivability of forces in the event of an attack.  The key principle behind posturing is 
anticipating cyber attacks and then planning and implementing measures to ensure the 
survivability of friendly combat power.  Posturing can done reactively in response to 
conflict escalation.  It can also be done proactively in preparation for friendly combat 
operations.  Posturing tasks include the employment of cover, concealment, dispersal, 
camouflage, hardening, redundancy, and deception (e.g. decoys) in combination to 
increase the survivability of friendly cyberspace.  Posturing assumes that attacks are to be 
expected and does not assume away an enemy’s will or capability to initiate the attack.  
Therefore, friendly cyber defense forces should never be caught unprepared.  Finally, 
posturing supports maneuver and recover by maximizing the combat power available for 




The second doctrinal function for CND is maneuvering.  Maneuver 
encompasses proactive and reactive actions taken in response to and during attacks.  It 
also includes offensive and defensive maneuvers to engage with and/or retreat from the 
enemy.  From the defensive perspective, the purpose of maneuvering is to preserve 
friendly combat power.  During an attack, one of the most difficult steps is to develop an 
initial list of possible countermeasures in response.  The basic maneuvering tasks provide 
this initial list of actions that can be taken during an attack, and this list includes attacking 
(the source), defending (fighting in place), relocating (moving to a more advantageous or 
less vulnerable portion of cyberspace like a redundant command-and-control node or to a 
more secure network), augmenting (to shore up defenses), withdrawing (shutting down or 
abandoning networks or systems), or delaying (any actions that buys time for friendly 
cyber forces to take other actions).  Maneuver also implies that defenses should be 
dynamic and should not solely rely on static fortifications, as is the accepted 
methodology today.  Cyber defenders must be creative and take the initiative in order to 
outmaneuver their attackers in cyberspace.  Finally, maneuver supports posturing and 
recovery by further increasing the survivability of friendly combat power. 
 
c. Recover 
The final doctrinal function for CND is recovery.  The recover function 
encompasses actions taken to recover and reconstitute combat capabilities.  Recovery 
includes performing battle damage assessment (BDA), repairs, reconstitution, and 
emergency containment of extreme damage to mitigate its impact on the entire force.  
This step is vital to restoring maximum combat power as quickly as possible.  Recovery 
is also dependent upon rear logistics support (spares, manpower, connectivity, 
bandwidth/throughput, etc.).  Recovery supports posturing and maneuver by restoring 
























Figure 18.   CND Doctrinal Tasks 
 
C. SUMMARY 
The proper combination of technology employment, operational command and 
control, and operational employment are key to the development of an effective cyber 
defense capability.  By combining the doctrinally significant attributes of the cyberspace 
warfighting domain and the doctrinal lesson of successful and failed air defense 
campaigns, this chapter recommends that the DoD invest resources towards the 
development of joint, integrated cyber defense capabilities analogous to historically 
successful integrated air defenses.  Technology employment provides the tactical 
foundation upon which to build this capability; however, operational level C2 and 
operational level employment provide the doctrine necessary to translate tactical 
successes into operational leverage.  Finally, the DoD is currently lacking in all three of 
these areas despite the fact that adversary states are investing in developing more 
powerful cyber warfare capabilities.  The solution is clear:  the DoD needs to properly 
invest in the development and employment of new technologies and the related 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has explored the doctrinal concepts needed to develop the proper 
technology, operational employment concepts, and operational command and control to 
build an effective integrated cyber defense capability for the DoD.  By defining the basic 
attributes of the warfighting domain of cyberspace, this thesis established that the 
cyberspace domain has characteristics comparable to those of the air warfighting domain.  
Then by analyzing successful and failed defensive air campaigns of the past, an initial 
framework was developed to describe the necessary components of an effective 
integrated cyber defense capability. 
The arena of cyber warfare, however, is still virgin territory.  One purpose of this 
research was to provide an answer to the question of how the DoD should go about 
building a viable cyber defense capability; however, the more important purpose of this 
research was to provide a usable methodology by which to identify and ask the right 
doctrinal questions to glean these answers due to our limited real historical experience of 
conducting cyberwars.  As such, this thesis looked at cyber defense through a 
conventional doctrine lens to tease out some doctrinal truths.  Future research through an 
unconventional doctrinal lens may also provide useful insights for further developing 
DoD cyber defense capabilities.  In addition, this thesis used the development of air 
power doctrine to ask and answer questions relating to cyber defense doctrine; however, 
the cyberspace domain also shares attributes with the sea, land, and space warfighting 
domains.  Future research comparing cyberspace to these other domains may also reveal 
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APPENDIX A:  KEY DOD AND SERVICE PUBLICATIONS 
* Note:  Please reference the “List of References” for complete bibliographical 
information on these sources. 
 
A. DoD-level Publications: 
 
 DODI 5200.40:  Defense Information Technology Security Certification and 
Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) 
 DODD 8500.1:  Information Assurance (IA) 
 DODI 8500.2:  Information Assurance (IA) Implementation 
 DODD 8530.1:  Computer Network Defense 
 DODI 8530.2:  Support to Computer Network Defense (CND) 
 
B. CJCS-level Publications: 
 
 CJCSI 3401.03:  Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense 
(CND) 
 CJCSI 6510.01 Series:  Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network 
Defense (CND) 
 CJCSM 6510.01:  Defense-in-Depth:  Information Assurance (IA) and Computer 
Network Defense (CND)  
 JP 3-13:  Information Operations 
 JP 3-13.1:  Electronic Warfare 
 JP 3-13.3:  Operations Security 
 JP 3-13.4:  Military Deception 
 JP 3-53:  Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations  
 Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook 
 
C. Combatant Commander-level Publications: 
 
 SD 527-1:  Department of Defense (DOD) Information Operations Condition 
(INFOCON) System Procedures 
 
 80 
D. Service-level Publications: 
 
 AFDD 2-5:  Information Operations 
 AFI 33-115 Volume 1:  Network Operations 
 AFI 33-202:  Network and Computer Security 
 FM 3-13:  Information Operations Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
 OPNAV INST 5239.1A:  Department of the Navy Automatic Data Processing 
Security Program 
 OPNAV INST 5239.3:  Navy Implementation Department of Defense Intelligence 
Information System (DODIIS) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
 OPNAV INST 5450.231:  Mission, Functions and Tasks of the Fleet Information 
Warfare Center (FIWC) 
 MCWP 3-40.4:  Marine Air Ground Task Force Information Operations 
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APPENDIX B:  KEY CYBER WARFARE PUBLICATIONS 
* Note:  Please reference the “List of References” for complete bibliographical 
information on these sources.  
 
A. Strategic-level Publications: 
 
 Information Operations Roadmap (DECLASSIFIED), dated Oct 30, 2003 
 Gregory Rattray’s Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace 
 Information Warfare - Defense (IW-D)  
 Alan D. Campen’s, et al. Cyberwar:  Security, Strategy, and Conflict in the 
Information Age 
 Arthur F. Galpin’s Computer Network Defense for the United States of America 
 Jacques S.  Gansler’s “Protecting Cyberspace.” in Hans Binnendijk, ed., 
Transforming America’s Military 
 Robert H. Anderson’s, et al. Securing the U.S. Defense Information 
Infrastructure:  A Proposed Approach 
 
B. Operational-level Publications: 
 
 Juan Vega’s Computer Network Operations Methodology 
 
C. Tactical/Technical-level Publications: 
 
 Dorothy E. Denning’s Information Warfare and Security 
 RAND’s Advanced Network Defense Research 
 Peng Liu’s, et al. Trusted Recovery and Defensive Information Warfare 
 Eric J. Holdaway’s Active Computer Network Defense:  An Assessment 
 Oren K. Upton’s Asserting National Sovereignty in Cyberspace:  The Case for 
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APPENDIX C:  SERVICE WARFIGHTING FUNDAMENTALS 
 
Table 3.   Service Warfighting Fundamentals (From 95) 
 
                                                 
95 “Block 1.4:  Operational Art Briefing,” Joint Maritime Operations, slides presented at the Navy 
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APPENDIX D:  MILITARY FORCES - BATTLE OF BRITAIN 
Country Combat Force Strength 
Great Britain Ground: 
27 infantry divisions* 
1 armor division with 963 tanks (103**) 
 
Sea: 




151 bombers (84***) 
 
Country Combat Force Strength 
Germany Ground: 
13 divisions (90,000 infantry + 30,000 airborne infantry)**** 
650 tanks **** 
 
Air: 
1055 fighters (824***) 
1447 bombers (1017***) 
Table 4.   Military Force Strength - Battle of Britain96 
 
* Most infantry divisions were at less than half of their manpower strength of 15,500 men 
and had only one-sixth of their required complement of field guns and anti-tank guns, as 
well as being short on armored vehicles and machine guns. 
 
** Only 103 British tanks were capable of countering existing German armor. 
 
*** Only 507 British fighters and 84 British bombers were serviceable.  Only 824 
German fighters and 1017 German bombers were serviceable. 
 
**** The numbers include only the first wave forces committed to the invasion.  Follow-
on forces would bolster the number of ground forces to 260,000 men in 41 divisions, to 
include 30 infantry, 6 Panzer, 3 motorized, and 2 airborne divisions. 
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APPENDIX E:  AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - BATTLE OF BRITAIN 









463 Hurricanes (347) 
286 Spitfires (160) 
37 Defiants  (25) 
114 Blenheims  (59) 










Total:  ~2102 
Grand Total 900 (591) 885 ~2102 
 







809 Me-109 (656) 
246 Me-110 (168) 
316 Ju-87  (248) 
1131 Ju-88/ 
   He-111/Do-17 (769) 












Total:  ~600 
Grand Total 2502 (1841) 1472 ~600 
Table 5.   Air Order of Battle (Combat Aircraft Only) - Battle of Britain (After 97) 
 
* Note that these numbers include only combat aircraft since non-combat aircraft have 
limited to no utility in providing air superiority.  Also, the numbers in parentheses 
represent the number of serviceable aircraft out of the total. 
 
Month RAF** Luftwaffe** 
July 1,482 906 
Aug 1,456 869 
Sept 1,558 735 




(+60 per month) 
796 
(-78 per month) 
Table 6.   Single-Engine Fighter Pilot Strength - RAF versus Luftwaffe (After 98) 
 
** Based upon number of pilots available at or near the beginning of each month. 
                                                 
97Len Deighton, Battle of Britain,. 92, 96-97, 101, 115, 149, 165, 167-168, 172-173, and 199; Richard 
Overy, The Battle of Britain:  The Myth and the Reality, 35-37, 159-161; and Frank Heilenday, The Battle 
of Britain -- Luftwaffe vs. RAF:  Lessons Learned and Lingering Myths from World War II (P-7915), 3-4. 
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APPENDIX F:  MILITARY FORCES - SIX DAYS WAR 
Country Combat Force Strength Combat Losses 





40 planes (13% loss) 
Grand Total 264,000 troops 
800 tanks 
300 planes 
2,000 (1% loss) 
unknown 
40 planes (13% loss) 
 
Country* Combat Force Strength Combat Losses 
Egypt 240,000 troops 
1,200 tanks 
580 planes 
80K-100K troops (>33% loss) 
700-800 tanks (58% loss) 
431 planes (74% loss) 
Syria 50,000 troops 
400 tanks 
136 planes 
1,000 (< 1% loss) 
unknown 
59 planes (43% loss) 
Jordan 50,000 troops 
200 tanks 
40 planes 
5,000 (8% loss) 
unknown 
19 plans (48% loss) 
Grand Total 340,000 troops 
1,800 tanks 
756 planes 
80K-100K troops (>24% loss) 
700-800 tanks (>39% loss) 
509 planes (67% loss) 
Table 7.   Military Force Strength - Six Days War (After 99) 
 
* Note:  Force numbers for Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have been 
purposefully excluded because their respective forces were never fully committed to 
combat. 
                                                 
99 “Armed Conflict Events Data:  The Six Days War,” On War.com, 
http://onwar.com/aced/data/9999/6day1967.htm, last accessed Oct 15, 2007; Hal Kosut, ed., Israel and the 
Arabs:  The June 1967 War,  67; and “The EAF History,” 
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APPENDIX G:  AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - SIX DAYS WAR 
Country Size of AF Combat Aircraft** Combat Aircraft Losses  




8,000 72 Mirage III CJs 
25 Vautour IIAs 
20 Super Mystere B2s 
40 Mystere IVs 
40 Ouragans 
60 Fouga Magisters 
Total:  257 
6 Mirage III CJs 
5 Vautour IIAs 
0 Super Mystere B2s 
9 Mystere IVs 
4 Ouragans 
6 Fouga Magisters 
Total:  30 (12% loss) 
Grand Total 8,000 257 30 (12% loss) 
 
Country* Size of AF Combat Aircraft** Combat Aircraft Losses  
















89 MiG-17s & MiG-15s 
 
14 Su-7s 

















2,000 21 Hunter MK6s 
Total:  21 
21 Hunter MK6s 
Total:  21 (100% loss) 
Grand Total 31,000 576-623 370 (59-64% loss) 
Table 8.   Air Order of Battle (Combat Aircraft Only) - Six Days War (After 100) 
 
* Note:  Force numbers for Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have been purposefully 
excluded because their respective air forces were never fully committed to combat. 
 
** Note that these numbers include only combat aircraft since non-combat aircraft have limited to 
no utility in providing air superiority. 
                                                 
100 Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory:  The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1947, Dubuque, IA:  
Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1992,  333; le Moniteur de l’Aeronautique 1966-67 in Rodney S. Crist, 
Air Superiority: A Case Study, Newport, RI:  Naval War College, 1988, 25; Hal Kosut, ed., Israel and the 
Arabs:  The June 1967 War, 67; “Arab-Israeli Aircraft Losses,” 
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hangar/2848/losses.htm, last accessed Oct 25, 2007; and “The 
EAF History,” http://www.geocities.com/egyptianairforce/history.html, last accessed Oct 15, 2007.  Note 
that the original chart was derived from Ronald D. Jones, Israeli Air Superiority in the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War:  An Analysis of Operational Art, Newport, RI:  Naval War College, 1996,. 16-17; however, I went 
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